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PURSUING "ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE":
THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Richard J. Lazarus *
I.

INTRODUCTION

Environmental protection policy has been almost exclusively concerned with two basic issues during the last several decades: (1) what is
an acceptable level of pollution; and (2) what kinds of legal rules would
be best suited for reducing pollution to that level. By contrast, policymakers have paid much less attention to the distributional effects, including the potential for distributional inequities, of environmental protection
generally.
To be sure, scholars have engaged in considerable discussion of how
the costs of environmental controls affect particular industries, and how
these costs place a disproportionate burden on new versus existing, and
large versus small, industrial sources of pollution.! But there has been at
best only an ad hoc accounting of how the benefits of environmental protection are spread among groups of persons. And, when the costs of pollution control have been considered, such discussions have been narrowly
confined to the economic costS.2 There has been virtually no accounting
of how pollution controls redistribute environmental risks among groups
• Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. Thanks are owed to Peter
Byrne, Luke Cole, Chris Desan, Barbara Flagg, Michael Gerrard, and Chris Schroeder, and also to
Tobie Bernstein, Wendy Brown, Richard Delgado, Rachel Godsil, Arnold Reitze, Douglas Williams, and participants in Northwestern University School of Law's faculty workshop for their comments on earlier drafts, which much improved this Article. Washington University law students
Jennifer Sheehan, Christopher Perzan, and Patricia Verga provided valuable research assistance, but
most deserving of thanks is Kevin Brown, Class of 1992, who taught me that this was a topic warranting greater academic inquiry.
! See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L.
REv. 1333, 1335-36 (1985); B. Peter Pashigian, The Effect of Environmental Regulation on Optimal
Plant Size and Factor Shares, 27 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1984); Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk
Regulation, 69 VA. L. REv. 1025 (1983); WILLIAM TUCKER, PROGRESS AND PRIVILEGE: AMERICA
IN THE AGE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM (1982) (author contends that environmentalism has unwittingly aided big business at the expense of small business and has inappropriately discounted the
advantages of human process); Keith Schneider, Rules Forcing Towns to Pick Big New Dumps or Big
Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1992, at AI; but see Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873, 895-96 (1987) (questioning substantiality of evidence
that environmental laws favor larger plants).
2 See infra note 44.
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of persons, thereby imposing a cost on some for the benefit of others. 3
The 1970s marked the heyday of the modem environmental era.4
Earth Day in 1970 caught the imagination of a nation seeking consensus
in the midst of the internal conflict engendered by the Vietnam war.
Largely ignored in the celebration that accompanied the passage of a series of ambitious environmental protection laws during this time were
those distinct voices within minority communities that questioned the
value of environmentalism to their communities. They did not share in
the national consensus that these new laws marked a significant movement towards a more socially progressive era. Some minority leaders
described environmentalism as "irrelevant" at best and, at worst, "a deliberate attempt by a bigoted and selfish white middle-class society to
perpetuate its own values and protect its own life style at the expense of
the poor and the underprivileged."5 Environmentalists were seen as ignoring both the "urban environment" and the needs of the poor in favor
of seeking "governmental assistance to avoid the unpleasant externalities
of the very system from which they themselves have already benefitted so
extensively."6 As one commentator described, environmentalists "would
prefer more wilderness . .. for a more secure enclave in nature from the
restlessness of history and the demands of the poor."7 A prominent
3 One notable exception in the context of environmental land use regulation is DANIEL R.
MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND EQUITY: A REGULATORY CHALLENGE (1981).
4 President Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190,
83 Stat. 445 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1988» on January 1, 1970, and Congress followed
soon afterwards by passing the Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7404-7407, 7415-7418, 7601-7602 (1988», the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-240, 86 Stat. 47 (omitted as superseded by 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1287 (1988», the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988», the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-140, 89 Stat. 751 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136-136y (1988», the
Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2671 (1988», and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988», followed by substantial revisions in
1977 of both the clean air, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988», and clean water, Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-217,91 Stat. 1566 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1287 (1988», legislation. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation ofFederal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 323-28 (1991).
5 James N. Smith, The Coming of Age of Environmentalism in American Society, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN URBAN AMERICA 1 (James N. Smith ed., 1974) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE].
6 Peter Marcuse, Conservation for Whom?, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND SOCIAL JusTICE, supra note 5, at 17, 27; see also Charles E. Little, The Double Standard of Open Space, in
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 73, 75 ("The logic of our policy
seems to rest on this syllogism: inner cities have no greenery; poor people live in inner cites; therefore parks, open space, and wilderness are not necessary for them. City parks budgets shrink, the
disenfranchised are barred from suburbia, and National Park tourism policies tend to exclude the
non-affluent.").
7 Rev. Richard Neuhaus, In Defense of People: A Thesis Revisited, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL-
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black elected official put it even more bluntly: "[T]he nation's concern
with the environment has done what George Wallace has been unable to
do: distract the nation from the human problems of black and brown
Americans. "8
Neither the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
nor the mainstream environmental groups appear to have paid attention
to these charges. 9 Quite possibly, this was because such claims were so
unsettling and potentially divisive, particularly to the extent that they
implicated the welfare of racial minorities. The environmental movement of the 1970s finds much of its structural roots and moral inspiration
in the civil rights movement that preceded it.IO Hence, for many in the
environmental community, the notion that the two social movements
could be at odds was very likely too personally obnoxious to be believed
or even tolerated. 11
1TY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 59, 62 (excerpt from conference presentation of Rev.
Neuhaus).
8 Leonard G. Ritt & John M. Ostheimer, Congressional Voting and Ecological Issues, 3 ENVTL.
AFF. 459, 465 & n.18 (1974) (quoting The Rise ofAnti-Ecology?, TIME, Aug. 3, 1970, at 42 (quoting
Richard Hatcher, Mayor of Gary, Indiana)). More recently, Professor Derrick Bell fantasized the
possibility that white Americans would agree to the enslaving of all black Americans in exchange for
"gold to bailout near insolvent federal, state and local governments, chemicals to purify the almost
uninhabitable environment, and a safe, affordable nuclear technology to relieve the nation's energy
woes." Derrick A. Bell, Racism: A Prophecy for the Year 2000, 42 RUTGERS L. REv. 93, 98 (1989).
9 Greenpeace, U.S.A., is one frequently cited exception. See Safir Ahmed, Seeing Red Over the
Green Movement, RIVERFRONT TIMES, Nov. 6-12, 1991, at 10, 11; Norris MacDonald, Environmental Activities in Communities of Color, in ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: ISSUES AND DILEMMAS 32,34
(Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1991) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM]; see also infra pp.
835-38.
10 The environmental movement's prominence in the aftermath of the civil rights movements'
successes in the 19605 was not mere happenstance. Environmental groups not only adopted organizational structures, civil disobedience approaches, and litigation strategies based on those utilized by
civil rights organizations, but also used the rhetorical power of the civil rights movement on behalf
of environmental protection. Environmental rights were analogized to civil rights, and parallels
were drawn between the emancipation of African-Americans and the emancipation of wildlife, plant
life, and nature in general. See generally RODERICK F. NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE 6-7,34-35,
144-45,162-63, 199-213 (1989) (concept of natural rights of people expanded to support the rights of
nature as free from human domination); CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 13, 25,
28-29 (1990) (Bill of Rights in the U.s. Constitution supported the notion that citizens have the right
to be protected from pollution); PETER YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE POLLUTION 107 (1991) (conservationists, like the civil rights activists, relied on
the courts to affect change); see also, ELIZABETH DODSON GRAY, WHY THE GREEN NIGGER? REMYTHING GENESIS 1-8 (1979) (purported hierarchy of man above animals and nature is an illusion);
PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 234 (2d ed. 1990) (outlining belief that animals deserve more
humane methods of limiting their numbers by reducing fertility rather than by hunting); CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR NATURAL OBJECTS 49-53 (1974) (heightened awareness of the interplay of humanity and nature as functional
parts of a single organism called the planet Earth).
II Neuhaus, supra note 7, at 68 (paul Swatek of the Sierra Club describing as "reprehensible"
Rev. John Neuhaus' characterization of environmentalism as elitist and fascist). Other explanations
for the lack of attention to these concerns are more practical in nature. Few, if any, of those expres-
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More recently, however, the number of those suggesting that there
may be serious distributional problems in environmental protection policy has significantly increased, and the character of their claims has
shifted. Prominent voices in racial minority communities across the
country are now forcefully contending that existing environmental protection laws do not adequately reflect minority interests and, in some
instances, even perpetuate racially discriminatory policies. 12 For these
individuals, the potential for a regressive distribution of the economic
costs associated with pollution control is, while often mentioned, not the
principal focus of their concerns. Rather, it is the prevalence of hazardous pollutants in the communities where they live and work that draws
the brunt of their attention. One shorthand expression for such claims is
"environmental racism," 13 but "environmental justice" (or "equity") appears to have emerged as the more politically attractive expression, presumably because its connotation is more positive and, at the same time,
less divisive.
Until very recently, the legal academic community has paid relatively little attention to these emerging issues of "environmental jussing such concerns had ready access to those making policy decisions. Furthermore, it made little
sense strategically to risk alienating those within the environmental community, many of whom had
historically voiced support for minority concerns.
12 Roberto Suro, Pollution-Weary Minorities Try Civil Rights Tack, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993,
at AI. The year 1991 witnessed a proliferation of events, the most significant being the convening in
October of "The First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit" in Washington,
D.C. Approximately 300 delegates from minority community organizations working on environmental issues attended, as well as an additional 200 "participants" and "observers" from state and
federal government agencies, academic institutions, and mainstream environmental organizations.
The purpose of the meeting was to initiate a dialogue between these community organizations and,
even more significantly, to make a strong national statement regarding the seriousness of the
problems in the distribution of environmental risks. See Minorities Joining Environmental Movement, Charge ''Environmental Racism" at Conference, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 1656 (Nov. I, 1991);
Keith Schneider, Minorities Join to Fight Polluting Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1991, at
A20. During the fall of 1991, the State of New York Assembly held a series of four public hearings
around the state on "Minorities and the Environment." See MINORITIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
AN EXPLORATION INTO THE EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND CONDITIONS ON MINORITY AND LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES (1992) (reprinting of hearings transcripts).
Finally, even more recently, Representative Henry Waxman, chair of the House Subcommittee on
Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, held a hearing on
February 25, 1992, on environmental justice issues. This was the first congressional hearing on the
issue. Representatives from governmental agencies, minority environmental groups, and mainstream environmental organizations testified. See Disproportionate Impact of Lead Poisoning on Minority Communities: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter Lead Poisoning Hearings]
(not yet published; copy on file with the Northwestern University Law Review).
13 Dr. Benjamin Chavis of the United Church of Christ's Commission for Racial Justice apparently first used the term "environmental racism" in the early 1980s to describe the tendency of
government and business to locate in minority communities hazardous waste disposal treatment,
storage, and disposal facilities, and industries that emit toxic pollutants. We Speak for Ourselves:
Social Justice, Race & Environment, RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T, Winter 1991, at 12 (book review).
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tice."14 This absence of legal commentary contrasts sharply with a
growing literature in other academic and popular periodicals,15 with the
more recent efforts to increase awareness of environmental justice concerns within government,16 and with the filing of lawsuits derived from
such concerns in the context of formal litigation. 17
14 Students at the University of California at Berkeley Law School and New York University
Law School held conferences on the subject in 1990. See Daniel Suman, Reportback . •• Fighting
LULU's: Effective Community Organizing, RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T, Summer 1990, at 6. Students
at Harvard Law School sponsored a one-day workshop in March 1991 and again in November 1992,
and students at Washington University in St. Louis did the same in November 1991. Finally, students at the University of Michigan, Columbia University, and University of Minnesota law schools
sponsored meetings on the issue in January, March, and October 1992, respectively.
There are to date just a handful of articles and student notes on the issue, all of recent origin.
The first publication to address the issue in significant depth was a student note published in the
University of Michigan Law Review, which focused on the availability of equal protection claims to
remedy discriminatory siting of hazardous waste facilities, and the inadequacies of current state and
federal legislation. See Rachel D. Godsil, Comment, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH.
L. REv. 394 (1991); see also Luke W. Cole, Remedying Environmental Racism: A View From the
Field, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1991 (1992). Luke Cole of the California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., is
publishing an article, contemporaneous to this piece, on "environmental poverty law." See Luke W.
Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty
Law, 19 EcOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming Dec. 1992) [hereinafter Cole, The Need for Environmental
Poverty Law]. Descriptions of the issue focusing almost exclusively on hazardous waste facility siting
are contained in R. George Wright, Hazardous Waste Disposal and the Problems of Stigmatic and
Racial Injury, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 777 (1991); Kelly M. Colquette & Elizabeth A. H. Robertson,
Environmental Racism: The Causes, Consequences, and Commendations,S TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 153
(1991); and Naikang Tsao, Comment, Ameliorating Environmental Racism: A Citizen's Guide to
Combatting the Discriminatory Siting of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 366 (1992). Finally, there is a symposium issue on the subject in the University of Kansas Journal of Law and
Public Policy, which contains a series of short essays on the topic, the most significant of which is an
essay by Professors Regina Austin and Michael Schill discussing "minority grassroots environmentalism." See Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black. Brown, Poor & Poisoned: Minority Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 69 (1991).
15 See, e.g., ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY (1990) [hereinafter BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE]; Paul Mohai, Black Environmentalism, 71 Soc. SCI. Q. 744 (1990); Robert D. Bullard, Ecological Inequities and the New South: Black
Communities Under Siege, 17 J. ETHNIC STUD., Winter 1990, at 101 [hereinafter Bullard, Ecological
Inequities and the New South]; David Kallick, The Struggle for Community: Race, Class and the
Environment, 21 Soc. POL'Y, Fall 1990, at 18; Gar Smith, Freeways, Communities and "Environmental Racism", RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T, Apr. 1990, at 7; Pat Bryant, Toxies and Racial Justice,
20 Soc. POL'Y, Summer 1989, at 48; Dick Russell, Environmental Racism: Minority Communities
and their Battle Against Toxins, AMICUS J., Spring 1989, at 22; Robert D. Bullard & Beverly Hendrix Wright, Environmentalism and the Polities of Equity: Emergent Trends in the Black Community, 12 MID AM. REv. Soc. 21 (1987) [hereinafter Bullard & Wright, Environmentalism and the
Polities of Equity]; Robert D. Bullard & Beverly Hendrix Wright, The Polities ofPollution: Implicationsfor the Black Community, 47 PHYLON 71 (1986) [hereinafter Bullard & Wright, The Polities of
Pollution]; Robert D. Bullard, Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community, 53 SOC. INQUIRY 273 (1983) [hereinafter Bullard, Solid Waste Sites]; Susan Zakin, The Ominous Color of Toxic
Dumping, SIERRA, July-Aug. 1978, at 14; Julian McCaull, Discriminatory Air Pollution, 18 ENV'T,
Mar. 1976, at 26.
16 See infra notes 62-76 and accompanying text.
17 See EI Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc., No. C91-2083
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The purpose of this Article is to explore the distributional side of
environmental protection and, more particularly, to explain the significance of including environmental justice concerns into the fashioning of
environmental protection policy. Unlike earlier legal commentary, hazardous waste facility siting is not this Article's dominant focus. It offers
a broader, more systemic, examination of environmental protection laws
and policies.
The Article is divided into three parts. First, it describes the nature
of the problem. This includes a discussion of the varied distributional
implications of environmental protection laws, as well as the ways in
which racial minorities could receive too few of the benefits, or too many
of the burdens, associated with those laws. 18 The second part of the Article accepts (without purporting to verify) the thesis that distributional
inequities exist, and seeks to explain such inequities theoretically in terms
of the present institutional framework for the fashioning of environmental protection policy and the probable distributional implications of that
framework. The final part of the Article outlines how environmental justice concerns might be pursued within present and future environmental
protection law and policy.
II.

THE BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION LAWS

A. The Potential for Distributional Inequity
Environmental protection confers benefits and imposes burdens in
several ways.19 To the extent that the recipients of related benefits and
burdens are identical, no problem of discrimination is presented (there
may, of course, be other problems with the tradeoff). But identical recipients are rarely, if ever, the result. 20 Hardly any laws provide pareto
(N.D. Cal. July 8, 1991) (complaint filed); R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991),
aff'd, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); Bordeaux Action Comm. v. Metro. Gov't of NashviIIe, No. 900214 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 1990) (complaint filed); NAACP v. Gorsuch, No. 82-768-Civ-5
(E.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 1982) (denying preliminary injunction); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt.
Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd without op., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986); El Pueblo
para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,357 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1991); see also Frances F. Marcus, Medical Waste Divides Mississippi Cities, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 1992, at A13 (describes "environmental racism" lawsuits being brought on behalf of
minority community to prevent burning of medical wastes at incinerator).
18 This Article does not purport to single out for separate discussion the distinct distributional
issues affecting Native Americans, largely because those issues are closely intertwined with questions
of Indian sovereignty that, while important, are more case-specific than this Article's outlook.
19 See generally RICHARD B. STEWART & JAMES E. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 168-73 (2d ed. 1978).
20 One obvious source of disparity, which is not a focus of this Article, is intergenerational in
character. The beneficiaries of much environmental protection are future generations while the immediate economic costs of such protection fall on the present. Conversely, future generations are the
group most harmed by environmental degradation, while current generations reap the associated
economic value.
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optimality in the classic sense of making everyone better off and no one
worse Off.21 Virtually all laws have distributional consequences, including those laws designed to further a particular conception of the public
interest. 22 Problems of discrimination, therefore, may arise in the disparities between the distribution of benefits and their related burdens.23
The benefits of environmental protection are obvious and significant.
A reduction in pollution decreases the public health risks associated with
exposure to pollution. It also enhances public welfare by allowing
greater opportunity for enjoyment of the amenities associated with a
cleaner natural environment. Many would also contend that environmental protection furthers the human spirit by restoring balance between
humankind and the natural environment. More pragmatically, environmental protection laws are the source of new jobs in pollution control
industries. EPA recently estimated, for instance, that the recently
amended Clean Air Act would result in the creation of 30,000 to 45,000
full-time equivalent positions during 1996-2000.24
The burdens of environmental protection range from the obvious to
the more subtle. They include the economic costs borne by both the producer and the consumer of goods and services that become more expensive as a result of environmental legislation. For consumers, product and
service prices may increase; some may become unavailable because the
costs of environmental compliance renders their production unprofitable;
while other goods and services may be specifically banned because of
their adverse impact on the natural environment. For those persons who
produce goods and services made more costly by environmental laws,
personal income may decrease, employment opportunities may be reduced or displaced, and certain employment opportunities may be eliminated altogether.
Finally, environmental protection requires
governmental expenditures, the source of which varies from general per21 See EDGAR K. BROWNING & JACKQUELENE M. BROWNING, MICROECONOMIC THEORY
AND ApPLICATIONS 559 (3d ed. 1989).
22 Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211,
1214 (1991); BURTON A. WEISBROD ET AL., PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN EcONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 103, 555 (1978).
23 Of course, the perception among developing nations of just such a disparity is what prompted
many of them, during the recent United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development
held in Rio De Janeiro, to demand monies from wealthier nations. The justification for these payments was to compensate the developing nations for the costs associated with their taking action (for
example, greater protection oftropica1 rain forests) that would provide environmental benefits to the
entire world, including industrialized nations. See, e.g., Paul Lewis, Negotiators in Rio Agree to
Increase Aid to Third World, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1992, at AI. Indeed, the availability of such
transfer payments was not an incidental concern at the Earth Summit. Rather, it was a central focus
of the negotiations. See Paul Lewis, Pact on Environment Near, but Hurdles on Aid Remain, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 1992, at AI0; Paul Lewis, Pact Nears on Billions to Protect Nature in Third-World
Countries, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1992, at AI.
24 Business Gainsfrom CM Exceeding $ 50 Billion Projected in Draft EPA Study, INSIDE EPA,
Jan. 17, 1992, at 1, 10.
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sonal and corporate income taxes to special environmental taxes. 25
These expenditures necessarily decrease public monies available for other
social welfare programs.
The burdens of environmental protection, however, also include the
redistribution of the risks that invariably occur with pollution control
techniques that treat pollution following its production. For instance, air
pollution scrubbers and municipal wastewater treatment facilities reduce
air and water pollution, but only by creating a sludge that, when disposed, will likely impose risks on a segment of the population different
than the segment which would have been exposed to the initial pollution
in the air or water. 26 Additionally, the incineration of hazardous wastes
stored in drums and tanks converts a land disposal problem into an air
pollution issue (leaving, of course, a sludge residue that presents a different land disposal problem), and thereby may change the identity of those
in the general population exposed to the resulting pollution,21 Just transporting solid and hazardous wastes from one geographic area to another
for treatment or storage results in a major redistribution of the risks associated with environmental protection. Indeed, such transportation, and
the resulting shift of environmental risks, has been the recent subject of
massive litigation, as various jurisdictions have sought to export their
wastes or prevent the importation of waste from elsewhere. 28
Nor does the purported prevention of pollution, as opposed to its
treatment, necessarily eliminate the distributional issue. "Pollution prevention" frequently depends upon production processes that reduce one
kind of pollution by increasing another.29 For example, water pollution
25 "In 1987, EPA, the states, and local governments spent about $40 billion for environmental
protection. If recent trends continue, they will need to spend approximately $61 billion annually by
the year 2000." U.S. EPA, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC COSTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: 1981-2000 at ii (1991). The Federal Internal Revenue Code includes three "environmental taxes," including a tax on petroleum, a tax on certain chemicals, and a tax on certain
imported substances. See 26 U.S.c. §§ 4611-4612, 4661-4662, 4671-4672 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
Revenues from these taxes are used, inter alia, to fund the Hazardous Substances Trust Fund provided for by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). See generally Richard A. Westin, Tax Considerations, in 1
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, ch. 9 (Michael Gerrard ed., 1992).
26 CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, CONTROLLING CRoss-MEDIA POLLUTANTS 8-9 (1984).
27 It also creates a new land disposal problem. For instance, a municipal resource recovery
facility in Chicago, Illinois, that incinerates 350,000 tons of municipal solid waste each year produces 110,000 to 140,000 tons of ash, much of which is hazardous, that must be disposed. See
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 948 F.2d 345, 345-46 (7th Cir. 1991).
28 See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S.
Ct. 2019 (1992); Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992); National Solid
Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envt'l Mgmt., 910 F.2d 713 (lith Cir. 1990), modified,
reh'g denied, 924 F.2d 1001 (lith Cir. 1991), and cert. denied, III S. Ct. 2800 (1991); Government
Suppliers Conso!. Servo v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Senators See 'Civil War' Over
Waste Imports; Coats Says He Will Offer Import Ban Again, [Current Developments] Envt. Rep.
(BNA) 485 (1991).
29 As its name suggests, "pollution prevention" contemplates techniques for reducing the
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may increase as air pollution is decreased, or a decrease in the mining of
one kind of natural resource may be limited or completely offset by the
increase in mining of another. Such shifts in the type of pollution or
activity allowed will almost invariably shift those risks arising with the
"new" pollution or activity to different persons. Hence, pollution may
decrease for society as a whole, yet simultaneously increase for certain
sUbpopulations.
Racial minorities could therefore be disproportionately disadvantaged by environmental laws in a number of ways. For example, with
regard to the benefits of environmental protection, the natural environments that are selected for protection may be less accessible, or otherwise
less important, to minorities. This may be the result of priorities expressly established by statute, or by agency regulations or enforcement
agenda.
Inequities in the ultimate distribution of environmental protection
benefits may also result, paradoxically, from environmental improvement
itself. A cleaner physical environment may increase property values to
such an extent that members of a racial minority with fewer economic
resources can no longer afford to live in that community.30 Indeed, the
exclusionary impact of environmental protection can be more than just
an incidental effect; it can be the raison d'etre, with environmental quality acting as a socially acceptable facade for attitudes that cannot be
broadcast. 31
Minorities may at the same time incur a share of the burdens of
environmental protection that are disproportionate to those benefits that
they receive. Higher product and service prices may be regressive, as
may some taxes depending on their form. 32 Although whites are poorer
in greater absolute numbers than nonwhites, the latter group is disproportionately poorer in terms of population percentages. Minorities may
also more likely be the victims of reduced or eliminated job opportunities. Similarly, they may be less likely to enjoy the economic, educational, or personal positions necessary to exploit the new job
opportunities that environmental protection creates. 33 Finally, minoriamount of pollution created in the first instance. It is contrasted with end-of-pipe controls of pollution, which seek to minimize pollution'S threat after creation. See generally Pollution Prevention
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-13109 (Supp. II 1990) (need for more focused management to
prevent pollution at the source rather than at time of treatment and disposal); Frances H. Irwin, An
Integrated Framework for Preventing Pollution and Protecting the Environment, 22 ENvrL. L. 1
(1992) (the complex relationship of environmental effects requires an integrated framework of ideas
to more effectively prevent environmental problems).
30 A. MYRICK FREEMAN ET AL., THE EcONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 143 (1973); see
also A. Dan Tarlock, Western Water Law, Global Warming, and Growth Limitations, 24 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 979, 1001 & n.lS2 (1991) (discussing regressive nature of growth limitations).
31 See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
32 Sandra Postel, The Greening of America's Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1991, at Cll.
33 Of course, this would depend on the types of jobs created. To the extent that the environmen-
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ties may receive an unfair share of the environmental risks that are redistributed by environmental protection. Elimination of the risks in one
location may result in the creation or increase of risks in another location
where the exposure to minorities is greater.

B. Evidence of Environmental Inequity
To date, there has been relatively little systematic empirical investigation concerning the extent of inequity in the distribution of the benefits
and burdens of environmental protection. The evidence that is available,
however, "lend[s] support to the view that, on balance, programs for environmental improvement promote the interests of higher-income groups
more than those of the poor; they may well increase the degree of inequality in the distribution of real income."34
There are especially few studies, apart from anecdotal accounts, regarding the specific issue that racial minorities are distinctly disadvantaged by environmental protection laws. Those few studies, however,
lend substantial credence to the claim that such disadvantages do exist,
and suggest some reasons for their occurrence. As summarized in a recent congressional report, "[e]arlier studies conducted by government
agencies and non-profit environmental organizations have concluded that
disproportionate effects stem from many factors, including racism, inadequate health care, low-quality housing, high-hazard workplace environments, limited access to environmental information, and simple lack of
sufficient political power."35 Without a doubt, the available evidence is
not immune from challenge. But for present purposes, it seems enough
to suggest the strong possibility that virtually all of the theoretical distributional inequities outlined earlier in this Article are in fact occurring.
1. Benefits Of Environmental Protection.-The reduction of pollution mandated by environmental protection laws is likely to have the
greatest potential for a redistribution that is favorable to minority communities. After all, for the same reasons that minorities may disproportionately be the recipients of redistributed environmental risks, they also
were more likely subject to greater pollution in the first instance. There
is substantial support for the thesis that minorities have historically been
more likely to live in closer proximity to polluting industries than nonminorities. 36 There is likewise substantial evidence that minorities occupy
tal protection services required were both more labor-intensive and less dependent on skilled labor,
job opportunities might be available, albeit less desirable. A stated purpose of New York City's
recycling law, for instance, is to increase employment opportunities "for unskilled workers and
handicapped persons." NEW YORK CITY CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, ch. 3, n.* (Supp.
1990).
34 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
253 (2d ed. 1988).
35 H.R. REP. No. 428, WIst Cong., 2d Sess. 41-42 (1990).
36 For instance, a 1972 study concluded that in St. Louis, Kansas City, and Washington, D.C.,
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significantly more environmentally hazardous jobs and, as a result, suffer
a disproportionately higher number of environmentally-related injuries. 37
there was a significant difference between whites and blacks in exposure levels to suspended particulates and sulfur oxide. See A. Myrick Freeman III, Distribution of Environmental Quality, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ANALYSIS: THEORY AND METHOD IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 243, 264
(Allen V. Kneese & Blair T. Bower eds., 1972) ("In each city the average black family has a higher
exposure to both air pollutants than does the average family (black or white) with an income under
$3,000."); McCaull, supra note 15, at 26 (A 1975 report "shows that chances of being exposed to
poor-quality air in urban areas are greatest for persons in poverty, in occupations below the management or professional level, in low-rent districts, and in the black population."). The phenomenon
appears likely to be the same today. See Frances F. Marcus, As Jobs Come Calling. the Non-Wary
Unite, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1991, at A16 (describing proposal to build $700 million plant for
processing wood pulp and manufacturing rayon in mostly black community in Louisiana; minority
community opposed; governor, local white business interests in favor because of jobs and economic
activity that it will bring to community); Paul Ruffins, Blacks Suffer Health Hazards Yet Remain
Inactive on Environment, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1989, § 5, at 3 ("71 % of blacks and 50% of Latinos-as opposed to only 34% of whites-reside in cities and breathe the most polluted air. Often
they live in old housing with the highest concentrations of lead in the paint and plumbing. Between
1976 and 1980, more than 50% of all black infants under the age of 3 who were tested had blood
lead levels higher than the Center for Disease Control's proposed standards.... Minorities are also
likely to be exposed to toxins by working in the most hazardous jobs in the most unhealthy industries."). See generally Paul Mohai & Bunyon Bryant, Environmental Racism: Reviewing the Evidence, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE 13176 (Bunyon Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992); Cynthia Hamilton, Industrial and Environmental
Racism: The Denial of Justice, in ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 9, at 25 (race and poverty
together bring about environmental inequities); William K. Reilly, The Green Thumb of Capitalism:
The Environmental Benefits of Sustained Growth, 54 POL'y REv. 16 (1990) (urban poor experience
environmental degradation most directly); Bullard & Wright, The Politics ofPol/ution, supra note 15,
at 71 (much of industry found near minority and lower-income neighborhoods); BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 15, at 8; Paul Mohai & Bunyon Bryant, Environmental Inequities and the
Inner City (paper delivered at the Sixth Annual Technological Literacy Conference of the National
Association for Science, Technology & Society, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 1991» (copy on file with
author).
37 See Beverly Hendrix Wright, The Effects of Occupational Injury, Illness, and Disease on the
Health Status of Black Americans, in THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE MICHIGAN CONFERENCE ON
RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 128, 128-41 (Bunyon Bryant & Paul
Mohai eds., 1990) [hereinafter MICHIGAN CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS]. The Michigan Conference
Proceedings have recently been republished in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
HAZARDS, supra note 36. Professor Wright describes three (necessarily overlapping) causal explanations for why there is a disproportionately high risk of injury, disease, and death among black workers: (1) socially induced disease (resulting from "social, rather than physical, genetic or
environmental causes"), id. at 131; (2) physically induced disease ("those that occur because of
intrinsic factors such as diets, smoking or genetics"), id. at 133; and (3) environmentally induced
disease ("occur due to exposures in the environment"), id. at 135. In discussing each, she contends
that discriminatory attitudes and practices are at the root of the disproportionate impacts.
With regard to socially induced causes, Professor Wright discusses the prevalence of hypertension among minority workers and argues that "the social practice of discriminatory job placement
has resulted in the assignment of Blacks to extremely hazardous jobs that are also stress inducing."
Id. at 132-33. With regard to physically induced causes, Professor Wright contends that they are
often subterfuges by management to shift the "blame" to the victim when, in fact, "[m]yths or racist
stereotypes are often used to camouflage discriminatory job placement practices resulting in the
purposeful exposure of black workers to hazardous work conditions." Id. at 134.
Regarding environmentally induced factors, Professor Wright acknowledges the softness of
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However, for these same reasons, any across-the-board reduction in pollution (or increase in occupational safety) should confer on minorities a
larger benefit commensurate with their historically larger burden.38
It is not at all certain, however, that this expected proportional redressing of the past has in fact occurred. Without addressing the factor
of race, several empirical studies have suggested that the distribution of
benefits from a reduction in pollution is neutral or even regressive. 39
These benefits include federal subsidies to publicly-owned wastewater
treatment plants,4O and the advantages of better air pollution control,41
some of the data relating cause (exposure to pollutants) to effect (injury), id. at 135, but she ultimately concludes that existing data is sufficient to "suggest that the excess risk of cancer that exists
for black workers as compared to white workers may be due to greater exposure of black workers to
carcinogens in the workplace." Id. at 137. She cites several examples, including: (1) a tire manufacturing plant in which 27% of the black workers, but only three percent of the white workers, worked
in the most hazardous jobs at the plant, id. at 135-36; and (2) a ten-year study of the steel industry
showing that 89% of the nonwhite cokeplant workers, but only 32% of white workers, were employed in the hazardous coke oven jobs and, possibly as a result, that the nonwhite workers "experienced double the expected death rate from malignant neoplasms." Id. at 136. Reportedly, one
historical reason for the disproportionate number of Blacks working in the coke ovens was the myth
that black workers "absorb heat better." Id. at 133 (quoting Morris E. Davis, Occupational Hazards
and Black Workers, URB. HEALTH, Aug. 1977, at 16, 17). For a comparison of the occupations with
the highest percentage of nonwhite workers and those with the highest incidence of occupational
illness and injury, see JAMES C. ROBINSON, TOIL AND TOXICS: WORKPLACE STRUGGLES AND
POLITICAL STRATEGIES FOR OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 96-98 (1991) (rate of occupational injury for
California workers varies considerably with ethnicity); Morris E. Davis & Andrew S. Rowland,
Problems Faced by Minority Workers, in OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH: RECOGNIZING AND PREVENTING WORK-RELATED DISEASE 417,419-20 (Barry S. Levy & David H. Wegman eds., 1983) (statistics showing the annual percentage of nonwhite workers sufferingjob-reIated injury and illness in the
manufacturing industries); see also Peter T. Kilborn, For Hispanic Immigrants. a Higher Job-Injury
Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1992, at Al (hispanic factory and industrial workers are injured more
often than nonhispanic and black workers).
38 See E. Donald Elliott, A Cabin on the Mountain: Reflections on the Distributional Consequences of Environmental Protection Programs, 1 !CAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 5, 7 (1991) ("In my
judgment, minorities and the poor probably benefit disproportionately from environmental protection measures."); William K. Reilly, Environmental Equity: EPA's Position, 18 EPA J. 18, 22
(MarchiApril 1992) ("It is undeniable that minorities usually benefit from-are, indeed, the chief
beneficiaries of-more general efforts to protect the environment.").
39 The possible structural reasons for this phenomenon are outlined later in this Article at infra
pp.806-25.
40 Robert A. Collins, The Distributive Effects of Public Law 92-500, 4 J. ENVTL. EcON. &
MGMT. 344, 353 (1977). Professor Collins further found that the lowest-income classes received
some net benefit from the federal subsidy, while the middle income classes were net losers. Id. at
352-53.
41 See Michael Gelobter, Toward A Model of "Environmental Discrimination", in MICHIGAN
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 37, at 92 ("all changes in exposure have been regressively
distributed since 1970 (the year in which the Clean Air Act was adopted)"); F. Reed Johnson,
Income Distributional Effects of Air Pollution Abatement: A General Equilibrium Approach, 8 ATLANTIC EcON. J. to, 17 (1980) (While environmental policy "costs are approximately proportional
to income," data from previous studies "tend[s] to confirm the supposition that environmental policy
incidence is regressive, with only the top two income classes obtaining positive net benefits.") (summarizing results of a Swedish study on the income distributional effects of air pollution control).
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including those associated with programs directed at improving urban air
quality.42 A similar conclusion has been drawn regarding the impact of
federal occupational health and safety laws. 43

2. The Burdens ofEnvironmental Protection.-The burdens associated with environmental protection generally take two forms. First,
there are the economic costs of pollution control. These are typically
imposed on either the government or industry in the first instance, but
are ultimately redistributed through taxes and higher prices for consumer goods. They may also be indirectly redistributed through salary
cuts and layoffs. Second, as previously described, there are the burdens
of environmental risks that are necessarily redistributed by environmental protection laws. Although these laws strive for a net reduction of
risks, some discrete populations may suffer a net increase in the process.
The "burden" dimension to environmental protection has received
significantly more attention than the "benefit" side. Additionally, until
quite recently most studies addressing the distribution of environmental
protection burdens have focused on the economic costs associated with
such protection. Less attention has been paid to the distribution of environmental risks.
Most of the studies lend considerable support to the thesis that distributional inequities exist insofar as the distribution of burdens may be
regressive. Moreover, to the extent that these studies have specifically
considered the distributional effects upon racial minorities, preliminary
inquiries strongly suggest that inequities exist there as well.
(a) Economic costs.-Economists have occasionally studied
how the costs and benefits of pollution control are distributed. 44 These
42 David Harrison, Jr. & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Distribution ofBenefitsfrom Improvements in
Urban Air Quality,S J. ENVTL. EcON. & MGMT. 313, 314 (1978) ("[T]he absolute level of benefits,
measured in dollars ... rises consistently and substantially with income. Only when expressed as a
percentage of income are air quality benefits pro-poor.").
43 See Beverly Hendrix Wright, The Effects of Occupational Injury, Illness, and Disease on the
Health Status ofBlack Americans, in MICHIGAN CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 37, at 128,
129 ("Blacks and other minority workers ... have not benefitted from these improvements to the
degree that white workers have.").
44 BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 34, at 235-56; Roger H. Bezdek et aI., The Economic and
Employment Effects ofInvestment and Pollution Abatement and Control Technology, 18 AMBIO 274
(1989); Taylor H. Bingham et al., Distribution of the Generation ofAir Pollution, 14 J. ENVTL. EcON.
& MGMT. 30 (1987); Harry F. Campbell, On the Income Distributional Effects of Environmental
Management Policies, 12 WATER REsOURCES 1077, 1077-80 (1976); Collins, supra note 40, at 344;
Nancy S. Dorfman & Arthur Snow, Who Will Pay For Pollution Controll-The Distribution By
Income of the Burden of the National Environmental Protection Program 1972-80, 28 NAT'L TAX J.
101, 101-15 (1975); Freeman, supra note 36; Leonard P. Gianessi & Henry M. Peskin, The Distribution of the Costs of Federal Water Pollution Control Policy, 56 LAND EcON. 85-102 (Feb. 1980);
David E. Hansen & S. I. Schwartz, Income Distribution Effects of the California Land Conservation
Act, 59 AM. J. AGRIC. EcON. 294, 294-301 (1977); Harrison & Rubinfeld, supra note 42, at 313-32;
Johnson, supra note 41, at 10-21; Adam Rose et aI., Assessing Who Gains and Who Loses from
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analyses generally suggest that pollution controls are regressive. As one
commentator put it fairly early on, "[u]nfortunately, the further one
moves towards 'putting a price on pollution' the more regressive the burden generally becomes .... [W]hen it comes to cleaning up the environment, policy makers will be confronted with the classical dilemma
between distributional fairness and allocative efficiency."45
Economists offer several explanations for this distributional phenomenon. Some speculate that many of the environmental amenities
guaranteed by protective legislation are available, as a practical matter,
only to those with the wealth and time for their enjoyment. Furthermore, even when the improved environment is itself a low-income residential area, the resulting economic value is not necessarily captured by
those living in the area but is more likely to be gained by absentee property owners who can subsequently charge their tenants higher rent for
living in a cleaner neighborhood. At the same time, higher product
prices and displaced job opportunities resulting from pollution control
seem to have disproportionately adverse effects on persons with fewer
economic resources. 46 For example, much environmental land use regulation reduces the amount of land available for housing. This reduction
increases the price of both land and, therefore, housing, thus effectively
reducing the amount of affordable housing available to low-income
persons.47
Few of these studies confront the race issue directly. One study that
did concluded that distributional inequities existed along racial lines in
the distribution of the costs associated with water pollution control. The
Natural Resource Policy: Distributional Information and the Public Participation Process, 15 RESOURCES POL'y 282 (1989).
45 Dorfman & Snow, supra note 44, at 115. Those who question the extent to which existing
environmenta1laws promote efficiency, however, would likely contend that those laws are, for that
same reason, wrong-headed in both respects; that is, they promote neither efficiency nor distributional fairness. The Office of Management and Budget and some federal judges, for instance, have
recently suggested that environmental laws actually undermine public health concerns because they
make people poorer, and "richer is safer." In other words, an individual with more economic resources (i.e., wealth) is likely to be more healthy than an individual with fewer such resources.
Hence, because environmental laws decrease economic wealth (or so proponents of this theory assume), they simultaneously decrease public health. See, e.g., International Union v. OSHA, 938
F.2d 1310, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams, J., concurring) ("higher income can secure better
health, and there is no basis for a casual assumption that more stringent regulation will always save
lives"); Frank Swoboda, OMB's Logic: Less Protection Saves Lives; Letter Blocking Health Standardsfor 6 Million Workers Shocks Officials at Labor Dept., WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1992, at A15; see
also Frank Swoboda, OMB to Review Standards ofHealth Covering 6 Million, WASH. POST, Mar. 26,
1992, at A19 ("OMB said it has not abandoned the idea that federal agencies should be required to
determine whether protective health standards harm more workers than they help.").
46 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 36, at 273-74. To the extent that the cost of environmental
protection is imposed uniformly, moreover, its net impact is likely to be regressive. See Elliott, supra
note 38, at 8.
47 Daniel R. Mandelker, The Conflict Between Environmental Land Use Regulation and Housing
Affordability, 15 ZoNING & PLAN. L. REp. 1 (1992).
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study's author found, specifically, that "[w]hites have a greater absolute
burden, while nonwhites generally have a slightly greater proportional
burden" in the distribution of such costS.48

(b) Environmental risks.-Studies addressing the redistribution of environmental risks are far fewer in number than those concerned
with economic costs, but race has more frequently been a focus of inquiry
in the former. Two studies are no doubt the most widely acknowledged
because they advance the thesis that race matters in the distribution of
environmental risks and that racial minorities receive a disproportionate
amount of those risks.
The first study, entitled Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills and
their Correlation with Racial and Economic Status of Surrounding Communities, was prepared by the General Accounting Office (GAO) in
1983. Conducted in response to a request by Walter E. Fauntroy, a congressional representative from the District of Columbia,49 the GAO surveyed locations of hazardous waste landfills in the southeastern United
States. 50 Specifically, GAO examined offsite hazardous waste landfills
(not part of or contiguous to an industrial facility) located in eight southeastern states. The GAO found that "[b]lacks make up the majority of
the population in three of the four communities where the landfills are
located."51 The GAO also found that "[a]t least 26 percent of the population in all four communities have income below the poverty level and
most of this population is Black."52
The second study, undertaken by the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice (UCC) and reported in 1987, was far more
sweeping in its scope. 53 It purported to examine the location of controlled and uncontrolled hazardous waste sites across the United States
for the purpose of determining whether they were disproportionately located in racial minority neighborhoods. 54 The report concluded that
48
49

Gianessi & Peskin, supra note 44, at 97.
Representative Fauntroy made his request in the aftermath of his arrest at a demonstration
protesting the siting of a hazardous waste facility in a mostly black community in Warren County,
North Carolina. See Godsil, supra note 14, at 394 & n.3.
so U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SmNG OF HAzARDOUS W ASrE LANDFILLS AND THEIR
CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND EcONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983).
SlId. at 2.
52Id.
53 UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE
IN THE UNITED STATES (1987) [hereinafter UCC STUDY].
54 Id. at ix. The report defined "minority popUlation" as the "summation of the foIlowing populations: (1) Black population not of Spanish origin; (2) Asian & Pacific Islander, American Indian,
and Eskimo & Aleut populations not of Spanish origin; (3) Other non-white populations not of
Spanish Origin; and (4) Hispanic population." Id. at 63. The report was based on minority population figures derived from the 1980 U.S. Census, id. at 9, and on the 415 operating commercial hazardous waste facilities then listed in EPA's hazardous waste management system. Id. at 10. The
study compared five major variables, including" 'minority percentage of the population,', 'mean
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"[a]lthough socio-economic status appeared to play an important role in
the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities, race still proved to
be more significant."55 According to the report's authors, "[t]his remained true after the study controlled for urbanization and regional
differences. "56
The uee study found, in particular, that "[i]n communities with
two or more operating hazardous waste facilities or one of the five largest
landfills, the mean minority percentage of the population was more than
three times that of communities without facilities (38 percent versus 12
percent)."57 Furthermore, "[i]n communities with one operating commercial hazardous waste facility, the mean minority percentage of the
population was approximately twice that of communities without facilities (24 percent versus 12 percent)."58 The study also found that "[t]hree
out of every five Black and Hispanic Americans lived in communities
with uncontrolled toxic waste sites."59
The GAO and uee studies have been widely publicized, particularly within minority communities, and have generated considerable conhousehold income', 'mean value of owner-occupied homes', 'number of uncontrolled toxic waste
sites per 1,000 persons' and 'pounds of hazardous waste generated per person.''' ld.
55 ld. at xiii.
56 ld. According to the report, however, its statistical findings reflect a 90% confidence level, id.
at II, which is not particularly high. Apparently, the statistical methodology utilized in the UCC
study is also not uncontroversial. The study utilizes a "discriminate" rather than "regression" analysis technique, which is the more widely accepted basis for differentiating between the effect of multiple dependent variables. The UCC study also equates the siting of toxic sites with exposure to toxic
releases, and relies on present demographic data rather than the demographic data pertaining to the
time that the initial siting decision may have been made. A more recent study takes issue with some
of the UCC study's conclusions. Specifically, Professor James Hamilton considers the impact of a
community'S ability to engage in collective action on a hazardous waste facility's willingness to expand its waste processing capacity. James T. Hamilton, Politics and Social Cost: Hazardous Waste
Facilities in a Truly Coasian World (June 1991) (unpublished working paper, on file with the Northwestern University Law Review). Hamilton employs logistic regression analysis to conclude that collective action potential (measured by voter turnout in the 1980 presidential election) is a statistically
significant factor (at a 99% confidence level), id. at 22, and also concludes that "controlling for other
factors race is not a statistically significant factor in the expansion selection process[.]" ld. at 24.
Hamilton also concludes that "[n]one of the variables related to compensation demands such as
income or education are statistically significant." ld. at 22. Apart from the difference in statistical
confidence levels and methodologies utilized by the two studies, a major difference between them is
that the UCC study focuses on where sites are now located, UCC STUDY, supra note 53, at 10, which
allows for demographic changes after the siting decision is made, while the Hamilton paper looks to
the factors existing at the time that a facility manager makes a particular expansion decision. Hamilton, supra at 3. While the former inquiry is more descriptive of the problems actually faced by
minorities, the latter is more relevant to constitutional analysis that is concerned with a decisionmaker's subjective motivation. See infra notes 171-205 and accompanying text.
57 UCC STUDY, supra note 53, at 13.
581d.
59 ld. at xiv. According to the report, blacks are significantly overrepresented in the populations
of metropolitan areas with the largest number of uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. These include
Memphis (173), St. Louis (160), Houston (152), Cleveland (106), Chicago (103), and Atlanta (94).
ld.
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troversy60 and academic inquiry. 61 The most prominent response was a
conference held at the University of Michigan in January 1990 in which
academics and government officials from across the country presented
and discussed papers concerning environmental justice issues from a variety of perspectives. 62 The Michigan Conference participants thereafter
met with EPA Administrator William K. Reilly who, at their urging,
created an "Environment and Equity" working group at the agency.
This working group was charged with auditing the agency's policies from
60 See Michael Satchell, A Whiff of Discrimination?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., May 4, 1992,
at 34.
61 The most prolific writer and advocate on the subject of "environmental injustice" is a sociologist, Professor Robert Bullard, who has written numerous articles over the last nine years describing
how racial minorities are more likely to be exposed to toxic pollutants than are whites. See, e.g.,
Bullard, Ecqlogical Inequities and the New South, supra note 15; Bullard & Wright, Environmentalism and the Politics ofEquity, supra note 15; Bullard & Wright, The Politics of Pollution, supra note
15; Bullard, Solid Waste Sites, supra note 15. In 1990, Professor Bullard published a book on the
subject, which brings together in one volume much of his research and reflection on the issue. See
BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 15. Within that volume, Bullard explains that the largest
commercial hazardous waste landfill is located in Emelle, Alabama, where blacks represent 78.9% of
the population, and that the fourth largest landfill is located in Scotlandville, Louisiana, where 93%
of the population is black. Id. at 41. According to Bullard, these two sites alone have more than
one-third of the estimated licensed hazardous waste landfill capacity in the United States. Id. Bullard also describes how waste facilities tend to be in black neighborhoods. Id. at 43. Another study
of the impact ofrace on the siting of hazardous waste facilities has not supported either Bullard's or
the UCC Study's conclusions. See Hamilton, supra note 56.
62 See Bunyan I. Bryant & Paul Mohai, The Michigan Conference: A Turning Point, 18 EPA J.
9, 10 (1992). The titles of the articles included in the published proceedings provide a sense of the
scope of the Conference. They include: (1) Toxic Waste and Race in the United States; (2) Can the
Environmental Movement Attract and Maintain the Support ofMinorities?; (3) Environmental Blackmail in Minority Communities; (4) Environmental Voting Record of the Congressional Black Caucus;
(5) Toward a Model of "Environmental Discrimination"; (6) Minority Anglers and Toxic Fish Consumption: Evidence from a State-Wide Survey ofMichigan; (7) Invitation to Poison: Detroit Minorities and Toxic Fish Consumption from the Detroit River; (8) The Effects of Occupational Injury,
Illness, and Disease on the Health Status ofBlack Americans; (9) Hazardous Waste Incineration and
Minority Communities: The Case of Alsen, Louisiana; (10) Environmentalism and Civil Rights in
Sumter County, Alabama; (11) Uranium Production and its Effects on Navajo Communities along the
Rio Puerco in Western New Mexico; (12) Pesticide Exposure of Farm Workers and the International
Connection; and (13) The Dumping of Toxic Waste in African Countries: A Case of Poverty and
Racism. These papers generally supported the findings of the UCC Study. For example, a study of
the siting of hazardous waste incineration facilities in and around Baton Rouge, Louisiana, found
that "minority communities have an average of one site per every 7,309 residents. White communities have only one site per every 31,100 residents." Harvey L. White, Hazardous Waste Incineration
and Minority Communities: The Case of Alsen, Louisiana, in MICHIGAN CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 37, at 142, 149. Furthermore, when volume is factored in, "[t]he white communities have less than I % of the hazardous waste ... [e]ven though the minority communities are
significantly smaller .... " Id. at 150 (footnote omitted). The University of Michigan held a second
symposium a year later. The published proceedings include a statistical analysis of the Detroit area,
which concluded that while both race and income were significant determinants in terms of location
of commercial hazardous waste facilities (the chances of blacks living within a mile of such a facility
were approximately four-and-a-half times greater than whites), the effect of race was the "stronger"
determinant. See Paul Mohai & Bunyan I. Bryant, Race. Class, and Environmental Quality in the
Detroit Area, in ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM. supra note 9, at 42, 43.
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an environmental equity perspective, including both income and race as
factors to be considered. 63
This working group issued its "Environmental Equity" report in the
summer of 1992. 64 The report surveyed and evaluated existing data regarding the extent to which minorities may bear disproportionately high
burdens from environmental pollution, and its analysis of the data was
noticeably more refined and demanding than that of earlier studies. Perhaps for this very reason, however, the working group's report ultimately
lends substantial credence to the conclusions of prior, less detached
studies.
The report distinguished between "health effects" and "exposure to
environmental pollutants," and found (1) that existing data shows differences in "exposure to some environmental pollutants by socioeconomic
factors and race," and (2) "clear evidence that there are differences by
race for disease and death rates."65 Nonetheless, EPA also concluded
that a gap in the data exists concerning the relation between the two
findings. Specifically, the report noted that "[e]xposure is not the same
as health effects," and that "[t]here is a general lack of data on environmental health effects by race and income" and, more particularly, on the
"environmental contribution to these diseases."66 According to EPA,
63 Pursuant to the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11001-11050 (1986), there now exists a more useful source of data concerning toxic releases than
existed at the time of the earlier investigations, including those conducted by GAO and UCC. That
law established the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), in which companies must report the amounts of
toxics released from their facilities. Using that data, a recent graduate of Washington University
School of Law (St. Louis) examined the amount of toxic releases in predominantly (75% or greater)
White and Black neighborhoods of St. Louis, Missouri. He found that there were approximately
50% more toxic releases by weight in black neighborhoods, notwithstanding that their respective
popUlations were roughly equal to white communities. See Kevin L. Brown, Environmental Discrimination-Myth or Reality? 17 (Mar. 29, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Northwestern University Law Review).
64 See 1 ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP, OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING, AND EVALUATION, U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES, WORKGROUP REpORT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR (June 1992) [hereinafter EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY
REpORT]. EPA's release of the draft report in February 1992 caused a considerable stir. The day
that the report was released, Representative Henry Waxman (D. Cal.) held a press conference in
which he charged that the EPA report was a "public relations ploy" rather than a meaningful effort
"to understand and respond to the very real health problems faced by people of color." See Congressman Henry A. Waxman, Environmental Equity Report is Public-Relations Ploy, News Release
(Feb. 24, 1992) (copy on file with the Northwestern University Law Review). Representative Waxman
released, along with his critical comments, copies of internal agency memoranda in which agency
officials had similarly criticized the draft report for lack of candor regarding the "meagerness of
[EPA] efforts." See Memorandum from Ed Hanley, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Administration, to Clarice Gaylord, Re: Environmental Equity Report (December 1991) [hereinafter Hanley
Memorandum] (copy on file with the Northwestern University Law Review). Waxman also released a
copy of a dissenting opinion that certain EPA employees sought to have appended to the draft
report, but which agency officials ultimately declined to include.
65 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPORT, supra note 64, at 11, 13.
66Id.
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with the exception of lead, for which the evidence of disproportionate
impact by race is dramatic,67 "[t]or diseases that are known to be environmentally induced, there is a lack of data disaggregated by race and
socioeconomic variables. "68
The EPA report concluded that minorities have disproportionately
greater "observed and potential exposure" to environmental pollutants
and, specifically, noted four causes for this phenomenon. 69 The first is a
greater concentration of minorities in urban areas where emission densities tend to be greatest and, accordingly, where air pollution is usually
the most hazardous. 70 In fact, government scientists recently concluded
that blacks and Hispanics reside in higher percentages than whites in
geographic areas that are currently not in compliance with federal Clean
Air Act requirements for particulate matter, carbon monoxide, ozone,
sulfur dioxide, and lead.71 These scientists also concluded that income
alone did not explain the percentage discrepancy: "[A] comparison between poor, Mrican American, and Hispanic percentages shows that
these minority groups are more concentrated in [substandard air quality
regions] than the poor population in general."72 Additionally, in another
study described by EPA in its environmental equity report, epidemiologists found that ninety percent of steelworkers most heavily exposed to
certain organic pollutants were nonwhite and that these persons suffered
from respiratory cancer at a rate eight times more than would normally
be expected.73
Identified by EPA as the other causes of greater minority exposure
67 See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
68 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REpORT, supra note 63, at 11. The EPA report describes an
existing debate among commentators regarding the extent to which "differences in cancer rates between African Americans and Whites can be explained by the effects of poverty." ld. at 13. Some
commentators contend that virtually all of the differences can be explained by poverty, rather than
race (to the extent, of course, that the two factors can themselves be disaggregated), while others
posit that "there is still a substantial amount of variation that seems to be explained only by race or
ethnicity." ld. (citing Claudia R. Baquet et al., Socioeconomic Factors and Cancer Incidence Among
Blacks and Whites, 83 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 551-57 (1991); Ann Gibbons, Does War on Cancer
Equal War on Poverty?, 253 SCIENCE 260 (1991); Vincente Navarro, Race of Class Versus Race and
Class: Mortality Differentials in the United States, 336 THE LANCET 1238-40 (1990)).
69 The report stresses that the measurements of environmental contaminants represent the "potential" for exposure and not "actual" exposure. "Even though the potential for exposure may be
the same, not all potentially exposed persons will experience the same actual exposure." EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REpORT, supra note 64, at 13.
70 ld. at 13-14.
71 ld. at 14 (citing D.R. Wernette & L.A. Nieves, Minorities and Air Pollution: A Preliminary
Geo-Demographic Analysis, Paper presented at the Socioeconomic Research Analysis Conference II
(June 27-28, 1991)).
72 D.R. Wernette & L.A. Nieves, Breathing Polluted Air: Minorities Are Disproportionately Exposed, 18 EPA J. 16, 17 (1992).
73 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REpORT, supra note 64, at 17 (citing OFFICE OF HEALTH
AND ENVIRONMENTAL AsSESSMENT, U.S. EPA, CARCINOGEN ASSESSMENT OF COKE OVEN EMISSIONS (1984)).
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to environmental contaminants were (1) the physical proximity of minority populations to hazardous waste sites; 74 (2) minority consumption of
contaminated food;75 and (3) minority farmworker exposure to pesticides. 76 In each instance, minorities disproportionately engaged in certain kinds of activities (residence, diet, and work, respectively) that
exposed them to greater environmental risks.
Finally, the EPA report raised the possibility that minorities may
suffer disproportionately from environmental pollution not just because
they are in fact exposed to it in greater amounts, but also because certain
members of this group are more likely to be vulnerable to its adverse
effects. For most contaminants, certain population subgroups are more
sensitive than is the general population. According to EPA, there is reason to believe that "several population groups identified as being sensitive
to the health effects of air pollution seem to be disproportionately composed of low-income or racial minority individuals compared to the general population."77
III.

A.

THE STRUCTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL INEQUITY

General Causes: Racism and the Relative Absence of Minority
Economic and Political Power

The structural roots of environmental inequities are very likely the
same as those that produce other forms of racially disproportionate im74 EPA's discussion of the siting issue relies exclusively on the UCC and GAO evidence regarding the physical proximity of commercial hazardous waste treatment facilities or uncontrolled hazardous waste sites to minority residential communities. EPA simply recounts those earlier studies.
Somewhat surprisingly, it makes no independent effort to evaluate the veracity of these study's conclusions. See EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPORT, supra note 64, at 14-15. There is a cryptic
statement, however, suggesting the possibility of some controversy in this area. After summarizing
the prior studies, the report simply concludes "[ilt is clear that more study of this issue is required to
fully understand the associations of race, income, and facility location." ld. at 15. Apart from the
possible negative implications of this statement, the report provides no hint as to any deficiencies in
the prior studies.
75 See Patrick C. West et aI., Minority Anglers and Toxic Fish Consumption: Evidence from a
State-Wide Survey of Michigan, in MICHIGAN CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 37, at 108.
According to this paper, and other recent studies relied upon by EPA, many potentially harmful
environmental contaminants (e.g., PCBs, dioxins, furans) bioaccumulate to dangerous concentration
levels in fish, and those fish are not only eaten in disproportionate amounts by some racial minorities
(including Native Americans and Blacks), but are also prepared for eating in a manner (i.e., including skin and less fat trimmed) in which more contaminants will be consumed. EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPORT, supra note 64, at 15-16.
76 EPA's report describes how "80-90% of the approximately two million hired farmworkers
... are racial minorities," and how studies have shown that workplace exposure to chemicals in
agriculture is one of the areas of greatest human health risks. EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPORT, supra note 64, at 16.
77 ld. at 22 ("asthmatics, persons with certain cardiovascular diseases or anemia, and women at
risk of delivering low-birth-weight fetuses").
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pacts. In this regard, environmental protection is yet another expression
of a more widespread phenomenon.
The most obvious and common source are racist attitudes-whether
in blatant, thinly guised, or unconscious forms-that pervade decisionmaking. Historically, racial minorities have been persistent victims of
racial discrimination in this country. Although de jure discrimination is
now forbidden by law, racist attitudes, both consciously and unconsciously held, are plainly widespread. 78 These range from hostility toward racial minorities, to false stereotypical jUdgments about members of
that class. As Alex Aleinikoff recently explained, "[r]ace matters with
respect to the people we choose to spend time with or marry, the neighborhoods in which we choose to live, the houses of worship we join, our
choice of schools for our children, the people for whom we vote, and the
people we allow the state to execute."79 People routinely make stereotypical judgments about others based on racial identity.80 While such
judgments may appear less threatening than those based on outright racial hostility, their adverse impact may in fact be more potent because of
their pervasiveness and masked nature, which makes them so difficult to
identify and root out.
Therefore, it is not at all unlikely-and, indeed, it may be probable-that racist attitudes and false stereotypes have influenced various
decisions relating to environmental protection. Certainly there is no reason to suppose that environmental protection is somehow immune from
actions based on societal attitudes that, while widely condemned, are
nevertheless prevalent. 81 For example, the use of environmental quality
to support racially exclusionary zoning practices would seem to confirm
that suspicion. 82
78 Thomas A. Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1066-69
(1991); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
79 Aleinikolf, supra note 78, at 1067.
80 Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 429 (1988).
81 Professor Derrick Bell's "Chronicle of the Space Trader," in which white Americans trade the
freedom of black Americans for environmental protection is no doubt one of the most dramatic
statements of the proposition. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., After We're Gone: Prodent Speculations on
America in a Post-Racial Epoch, 34 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 393 (1990); Bell, supra note 8.
82 See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); cf International Union v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991); see also DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE,
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 567 (2d ed. 1980); Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable
Legacy of Euclid, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 101 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold A.
Kayden eds., 1989); cf Luke Cole, The Anti-Immigration Environmental Alliance: Divide and Conquer at the Border, in RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T, Summer 1992, at 13. There have been successful
equal protection claims brought against municipalities based on their failure to provide equivalent
services, including water and sewage treatment, to black neighborhoods. See Dowdell v. Apopka,
511 F. Supp. 1375 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (disparities in water, stormwater drainage in black/white neighborhoods motivated by discriminatory intent); Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D.
Fla. 1978) (race discrimination based on black neighborhoods not being provided with same level of
municipal services as white neighborhoods); see generally Martin Jaffe, Municipal Service Disparities:
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In any event, powerful vestiges of generations of racist policies
plainly persist, and these vestiges are self-perpetuating.83 As a result of
racist laws and attitudes extending back to slavery itself, racial minorities
today possess significantly less power both in the marketplace and in the
political fora, particularly at the national level. This absence of economic
and political clout makes it much more probable that racial minorities
will receive an unfavorably disproportionate share of the benefits (less)
and burdens (more) ofliving in society,84 including those associated with
environmental protection. 85 For example, the absence of economic resources compounds the threat of distributional inequities associated with
environmental protection. Because those with fewer economic resources
are disproportionately affected adversely by across-the-board price increases, such individuals are also more likely to suffer greater economic
harm when prices rise because of environmental protection. The economic plight of many minority communities also confines its members as
a practical matter to the less healthy residential areas which are, for that
reason, less expensive to live in. 86 This confinement also creates the potential for what some have dubbed "environmental blackmail,"87 as the
community finds it more difficult to oppose the siting of a facility that,
notwithstanding significant environmental risks, offers the possibility of
immediate short-term economic relief.88
In addition, persons with fewer economic means frequently conclude that they cannot afford the "luxury" of declining available work,
notwithstanding the environmental risks associated with the job. At the
Liability Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Feb. 1987, at
3, 3 (using Title VI as a claim in disparity-of-services suits).
83 See, e.g., Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REv. 828, 855
(1983).
84 See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1163, 1165 (1978).
85 See, e.g., Bullard & Wright, Environmentalism and the Politics of Equity, supra note 15, at 25.
86 See A. Myrick Freeman III, Distribution of Environmental Quality, in ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY ANALYSIS 243, 252, 257-58, 263 (Allen V. Kneese & Blair T. Bowers eds., 1972).
87 See generally Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Blackmail in Minority Communities, in
MICHIGAN CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 37 (environmental problems have become political issues as they threaten public health); see also DAVID ZWICK & MARCY BENSTOCK, WATER
WASTELAND: RALPH NADER'S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON WATER POLLUTION 400 (1971).
88 In commenting on a public utility company's decision to site a nuclear power plant in the
economically depressed community of Plymouth, Massachusetts, a company official reportedly referred directly to the relevance of the socioeconomic status of the town's residents to the company's
decision: "The town is sort of down on its uppers; it's sort of poor. When we announced it, they
said, 'Oh, Santa Claus came.' They are a better kind of people to deal with ... ." PETER YEAGER,
THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE POLLUTION 87 (1991). On the
other hand, the promise of economic benefits in exchange for environmental pollution may be more
illusory than real. Although the pollution and associated environmental risks will no doubt occur,
there is reason to suspect that many of the higher paying jobs in fact do not go to those in the
community, but to nonminority persons who reside outside the immediate vicinity of the polluting
facility. See Austin & Schill, supra note 14, at 69, 70.
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same time, when jobs are displaced because of pollution control costs,
those with less seniority are the ones most likely to lose their jobs. Minorities typically make up a disproportionately large percentage of those
employees with lower seniority.89 Furthermore, there is reason to suspect that minorities are also less likely to be in a position to obtain the
more highly skilled employment opportunities that are created in the pollution control industry90 or in other jobs becoming available as the nation
shifts away from a dependency on smokestack technologies. 91
Indeed, for these reasons, those commercial interests opposing environmental protection regulations have often sought support from minority communities. For example, in 1989 Washington D.C. voters defeated
a mandatory beverage recycling law reportedly because industry opponents successfully targeted minority communities with advertisements
suggesting that the law was regressive in its impact. 92 More recently, oil
company executives seeking support in their efforts to persuade Congress
to allow oil exploration and development in the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge singled out presidents of black colleges and universities, arguing
to them that their educational institutions could especially benefit from
the promotion of such developmental interests. 93
The relative absence of political leverage is at least as significant as
89 BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 15, at 12. Of course, these same factors can be
turned somewhat on their head to argue against redistributive efforts in environmental protection.
For instance, one could contend that the unilateral reduction of environmental risks in minority
communities would be a source of racial injustice, by denying members of those communities the
autonomy to choose for themselves between economic return and environmental risk. The members
of the community might have preferred the benefits associated with economic development. Indeed,
there are recent instances where industry has sought to "compensate" residents directly for the
increased risks through advance monetary payments. See Ronald Smothers, Future in Mind,
Choctaws Reject Plan for Landfill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1991, at A13. While this contention is not
lacking in rhetorical force, its persuasiveness rests at least in part on its unstated acceptance of the
legitimacy of the existing distribution of economic resources. If one were instead to assume that the
existing distribution is itself unjust (for instance, in part a vestige of centuries of racist policies and
attitudes), the question becomes considerably more complex. It becomes much harder in that circumstance to equate liberty with consumer choice. See WEISBROD ET AL., supra note 21, at 551; C.
Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REv.
741, 794-98 (1986). To be sure, the problematic nature of overriding an individual's decision to
forego environmental protection in favor of short term economic gain remains, but the propriety of
doing so seems stronger.
90 Bullard, supra note 87, at 62.
91 ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS-BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, AND UNEQUAL 107-33 (1992).
92 Paul Ruffins, Blacks Suffer Health Hazards Yet Remain Inactive on Environment, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 1989, at A3.
93 One sweltering Saturday in 1988 on a resort island in South Carolina, an oil industry lobbyist from Anchorage was lecturing the presidents of the nation's black colleges on the development potential of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.
If the presidents [of the black colleges] could drum up support among African Americans
for oil drilling in the pristine area, [an oil industry lobbyist] said, he would make sure that black
colleges got a slice of the estimated $297 billion revenue and royalty pie.
Brigid Schulte, Arctic Energy Debate Rekindled, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 26, 1990, at Cl.
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the absence of economic power. Entities within the federal government
with the greatest impact on the give-and-take process that marks environmental protection include the courts, offices within multiple executive
branch agencies, and a plethora of congressional committees with overlapping jurisdiction on environmental matters. Bargains struck in the
lawmaking process are expressed in the distributions of the law's benefits
and burdens among those interest groups competing for the decisionmakers' attention. Because legislative and regulatory priorities are
established through this lawmaking process, those wielding greater political influence over this process are more likely to have their problems
receive ample attention in the first instance. Where the resources required to enact a law or to initiate an enforcement action are especially
great, such a political advantage can very well be determinative of how a
program's benefits are ultimately distributed.
The same is true for allocations of those burdens associated with
environmental protection. Lawmakers inevitably seek the path of least
political resistance when allocating the burdens of environmental protection. 94 In deciding both from where and to whom environmental risks
should be reallocated in the treatment and prevention of pollution,
lawmakers are necessarily more responsive to the demands of constituents who possess the greatest political infiuence. 95 This phenomenon is
evident in the siting of other undesirable public projects and private undertakings, ranging from highways to prisons. There is no obvious theoretical reason why the same forces should not be at work when the object
of the project or undertaking is pollution control.
This is not to suggest, as some might,96 that the lawmaking process
nowhere evinces an effort on the part of lawmakers to discern a viable
public interest apart from the bargains struck by those special interests
See Hamilton. supra note 56.
This same phenomena no doubt explains recent increases in the international export of domestic solid and hazardous wastes to developing countries, which the 1989 Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes seeks to address by promoting "the
prohibition of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, especially [to] developing countries."
United Nations Environment Programme Conference of Plenipotentianes on the Global Convention
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, Final Act and Text of Basel
Convention, Mar. 22, 1989,28 I.L.M. 649, 657.
96 The extent to which "public choice theory" advances this view is itself a subject of debate.
Compare Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Understanding (and Misunderstanding) Public
Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 TEX. L. REV. 993 (1988) with Daniel A. Farber &
Phillip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REv. 873 (1987) [hereinafter
Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice] and with Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P.
Frickey, Integrating Public Choice and Public Law: A Reply to DeBow and Lee, 66 TEX. L. REV.
1013 (1988); see also William Bishop, A Theory ofAdministrative Law, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 489, 498
(1990) (public choice theory "purports to explain many of the activities of modem government as
having nothing to do with the public interest-except perhaps at the level of justification and propaganda-but rather to be motivated by attempts to redistribute wealth away from one group and
toward another.").
94

95
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competing before them for the purpose of their own wealth maximization. There is no doubt much merit to the contentions of those who resist that more cynical view of public choice theory and suggest that the
lawmaking process possesses some independent integrity.97 Likewise, the
power of interest groups to influence legislative and regulatory outcomes
seems to depend heavily on many context-specific circumstances, including the nature of their interest and the visibility of the issue. 98
My accounting of the formation of environmental protection laws
does not depend, however, on a wholesale embracing of public choice
theory, particularly the narrow notion of "economic rent seeking." The
mainstream environmental public interest organizations have clearly
played a significant role in the fashioning of those laws, and it is hard to
characterize fairly their interests in narrow economic rent seeking terms
(especially those that are nonanthropocentric in character).99 But, that is
not at all inconsistent with the common sense notions that environmental
protection laws possess a significant distributional dimension and that
this distribution ultimately reflects the concerns and values of those coalitions necessary for the law's enactment.
Finally, whatever susceptibility minority communities have to receive a disproportionate amount of the initial burdens of environmental
protection is multiplied over time because of their relative lack of economic and political clout. Once a particular geographic area becomes
the locus for an activity presenting a heightened set of risks, that has
historically been a reason favoring, not opposing, the siting of more such
activities in that area. The existing activities provide a surface "neutral"
reason for subsequent siting determinations.
B.

Exacerbating Causes: The Structure of Environmental
Policymaking

There exist, moreover, factors more endemic to environmental law
itself that may exacerbate distributional inequities likely present in the
context of any public welfare law. These factors suggest more than the
disturbing, yet somewhat irresistible thesis, that the distributional dimen97 See Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, supra note 96; Mark Kelman, On
Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public
Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988); Steven Kelman, "Public Choice" and Public Spirit, 87
PUB. INTEREST 80 (1987).
98 See KAy LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 312-17, 394-98 (1986).
99 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331, 356, 360 (1991). In this respect, I share Professor Don Elliott's view that much
of the support for environmental measures is "altruistic" in character. See E. Donald Elliott, Jr., A
Cabin on the Mountain: Reflections on the Distributional Consequences of Environmental Protection
Programs, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 5,7 (1991); see also Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure
in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. EcON. & ORGAN. 59, 64-65 (1992); but see WILLIAM TUCKER, PROGRESS AND PRIVILEGE-AMERICA IN THE AGE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM 28-39 (1982).
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sion of environmental protection policy likely suffers from the same inequities that persist generally in society. They suggest the far more
troubling, and even less appealing, proposition that the problems of distributional inequity may in fact be more pervasive in the environmental
protection arena than they are in other areas of traditional concern to
civil rights organizations, such as education, employment, and housing.
Indeed, it is the absence of that minority involvement so prevalent in
the more classic areas of civil rights concern that may render the distributional problem worse for environmental protection. Minority interests
have traditionally had little voice in the various points of influence that
strike the distributional balances necessary to get environmental protection laws enacted, regulations promulgated, and enforcement actions initiated. loo The interest groups historically active in the environmental
protection area include a variety of mainstream environmental organizations representing a spectrum of interests (conservation, recreation, hunting, wildlife protection, resource protection, human health), as well as a
variety of commercial and industrial concerns. Until very recently,lOl if
at all, the implications for racial minorities of environmental protection
laws have not been a focal point of concern for any of these
organizations. 102
Much of environmental protection lawmaking has also been highly
centralized, with the geographic focus in Washington, D.C.I03 The enactment of environmental statutes within that geo-political setting has
100 To my knowledge, no systematic inquiry has ever been undertaken to assess the involvement
of minorities in environmental law. The kind of study that would be required would consider not
just the identity and numbers of minorities within the more important points of influence, but would
also consider the nature of their involvement and, even more particularly, their relationship with
other persons having influence over the development of environmental protection policy. See generally EDWARD o. LAUMANN & FRANZ v. PAPPI, NETWORKS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION-A PERSPEcrIVE ON COMMUNITY INFLUENCE SYSTEMS 5-9 (1976) (describing principles of methodology
referred to as "social structural analysis"). A somewhat analogous study (on an admittedly smaller
scale) examining the structure of the Chicago Bar included just such a discussion of the racial dimension of the institution's "social structure." See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 295-96 (1982); see also MICHAEL J.
POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW
YORK CITY BAR AssOCIATION (1988). A study of "elite networks" in the national policy areas of
agriculture, energy, health, and labor, did not identify any minorities. See John P. Heinz et al., Inner
Circles or Hollow Cores? Elite Networks in National Policy Systems, 52 J. POL. 355 (1990).
101 See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
102 See A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Protection: The Potential Misfit Between Equity and Efficiency, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 871, 876 (1992) (describing "The Historical Roots of the Subordination
of Equity to Efficiency" in environmental law and policy); see also Cole, The Need for Environmental
Poverty Law, supra note 14, at 17-19.
103 The federal government has displaced decentralized decisionmaking in response to the widely
held perception that, given the rise of national markets and the interstate nature of many pollutants,
nationwide solutions were required for adequate environmental protection. See Richard B. Stewart,
Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1543-54
(1983).
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required the expenditure of considerable political resources. 104 As evidenced by the thirteen years required to amend the Clean Air Act, it is
no easy task to obtain the attention of the numerous congressional committees, and to form the coalitions between competing interest groups, so
necessary to secure a bill's passage. lOS
Environmental legislation has ultimately been produced through intense and lengthy horse-trading among interest groups, a process necessary to secure a particular environmental law's passage. 106 This process
has often depended upon the forging of alliances between diverse interests both within the environmental public interest community and within
government bureaucracy. Often, these unions have included so-called
"unholy alliances" between environmentalists and commercial and industrial interests, where the latter have perceived an economic advantage
to be gained (or disadvantage to be minimized) by their supporting an
environmental protection law that allocates the benefits and burdens of
environmental protection in a particular fashion.I07 Regardless of the
approach taken, or alliances forged, to procure a law's passage the in104 See Eskridge, supra note 99, at 361-63 (describing the "agenda-setting" role of interest
groups).
lOS See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 359-61 (1991).
106 See, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431, 454-59 (1989)
(describing how the policy preferences of the various players were key to the fashioning of the compromises necessary to secure passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977); Farber, supra note
99, at 62-70.
107 There are many examples of this phenomenon. The most widely proclaimed was no doubt the
alliance between producers of high sulfur coal and environmentalists that prompted Congress in the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 to require percentage removal of the amount of sulfur within
the coal combusted in addition to air emission reductions. This law had the effect of reducing air
pollution while also reducing the competitive advantage that the law would have otherwise provided
for producers of low sulfur coal. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER,
CLEAN COAL, DIRTY AIR OR How THE CLEAR AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DoLLAR
BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH SULPHUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT
(1981). Another example is the alliance between environmental groups and the railroads that have
successfully resisted, mostly on environmental grounds, federal support for the development of coal
slurry pipelines. The railroads, which receive significant revenue from coal transportation, have an
obvious economic incentive to resist the competition presented by slurry technology. See William F.
Webber, Coal Slurry Pipelines Are Ready, Willing, and Unable to Get There,ll ST. MARY'S L.J. 765
(1979-80). Perhaps the most notorious instance, however, is presented by the Federal Highway
Beautification Act of 1964, which was so successfully coopted by commercial interests that environmental organizations have subsequently supported its repeal. The federal law provides so much
protection for the billboard industry from the costs of the law's billboard restrictions that it actually
makes it more difficult for state and local governments to impose such restrictions than would otherwise be the case pursuant to their police power. See Ric~ard D. Lamm & Stephen K. Yasinow, The
Highway Beautification Act of 1965: A Case Study in Legislative Frustration, 46 DENV. L.J. 437
(1969). A recent account of alliances between environmentalists and private economic interests advances an extremely unflattering (and controversial) view of the forces behind environmentallegislation. See ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COST, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S. Greve &
Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992).
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volvement of a multitude of special interest groups is necessary. Indeed,
one major public interest participant in the negotiations required to secure passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which were the
culmination of over a decade of debate, characterized those negotiations
as "a special interest feeding frenzy."los
It is not surprising, therefore, that those environmental laws enacted
by Congress typically address some, but hardly all, environmental pollution problems. And, even with regard to those problems that are explicitly addressed, there are usually discrepancies and gaps within the
statutory scheme. Which problems are confronted, and where the discrepancies and gaps occur, is quite naturally an expression of the priorities of those participants who wield the greatest influence and resources
in the political process.
For this reason, much environmental legislation may not have focused on those pollution problems that are of greatest concern to many
minority communities. For instance, air pollution control efforts typically have focussed on general ambient air quality concerns for an entire
metropolitan region rather than on toxic hot spots in anyone particular
area. Accordingly, while there has been much progress made in improving air quality as measured by a handful of national ambient air quality
standards,109 there has been relatively less progress achieved over the last
twenty years in the reduction of those toxic air emissions which tend to
be of greater concern to persons, disproportionately minorities, who live
in the immediate geographic vicinity of the toxic polluting source. For
example, EPA has regulated only seven of hundreds of toxic air pollutants since Congress enacted the Clean Air Act in 1970. 110 The vast majority of governmental resources-federal, state, and local-have instead
been directed to more ambient pollution standards, such as sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and particulates. Such nonenforcement of the Act's
prohibition on toxic emissions effectively nullifies the law's environmenlOS See Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Court: Twenty Years of
Change and Beyond, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 285 (1991) ("West Virginia and Ohio will
get billions of dollars to build 'clean coal' plants. Steel mills in a few states will have 30 years to
control poisonous emissions, instead of the 10 years given other industrial polluters. Florida power
companies will get a $400-million, lO-year break on pollution control costs. Senators get more than
exemptions for their home state.") (quoting Michael Kranish, Politics and Pollution, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 9, 1990, at AI). Professors Robert Glicksman and Christopher Schroeder recently
summed up the phenomena nicely, albeit unsympathetically:
It would appear that the senators saw little distinction between the Clean Air Act and a fight
over which defense installations to close, or an appropriation for public works project. The
pork tastes as good, from whichever barrel it comes. Each constitutes an opportunity to benefit
the groups or interests that can in turn-benefit the politician.
Glicksman & Schroeder, supra at 286.
109 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REpORT 17 (1986) (summarizing environmental protection accomplishments since 1970).
110 S. REP. No. 490, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 151 (1990).
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tal protection mandate. I II
Likewise, and at the behest of mainstream environmental groups,
substantial resources have also been directed to improving air and water
quality in nonurban areas. Programs for the prevention of significant
deteriorations in air quality, the reduction of "acid rain," and the protection of visibility in national parks and wilderness areas, all require significant financial expenditures. 112 Substantial resources have similarly been
expended op. improving the quality of water resources that are not as
readily accessible to many minorities because of their historical exclusion. 113 Without meaning to suggest that these programs lack merit on
their own terms (for the simple reason that they possess great merit),
their return in terms of overall public health may be less than pollution
control programs directed at improving the environmental quality of urban America's poorer neighborhoods, including many minority
communities.
Lead poisoning provides an excellent illustration of how redirection
of some financial resources may go a long way toward improving the
health and welfare of minorities. There seems to be a widespread consensus that black children are disproportionately victims of excessive absorption of lead, a toxic chemical. 114 The Federal Center for Disease
Control, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR),
reported in 1988 that percentages of black children with excessive levels
of lead exceeded by several orders of magnitude the percentages of white
children with such levels. I 15 These differential impacts, moreover, could
III John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 EcOLOGY L.Q. 233, 277 (1990).
That there may have been neutral reasons for Section 112's nonenforcement, based on the impracticability of its mandate, see, e.g., John D. Graham, The Failure ofAgency-Forcing: The Regulation of
Airborne Carcinogens Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 1985 DUKE L.J. 100, 117-32, does not
explain away the discrepancy in resource allocation. Had toxic emissions been a greater priority to
majoritarian interests, it is unlikely that such nonenforcement would have been tolerated or, at the
very least, that needed legislative reform of the program would have taken over thirteen years to be
enacted (the time between passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91
Stat. 686, and enactment of the 1990 amendments to the law. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2468).
112 Craig N. Oren, The Clean Air Act of 1990: A Bridge to the Future, 21 ENVTL. L. 1817 (1991);
Craig N. Oren, The Protection ofParklandsfrom Air Pollution: A Look at Current Policy, 13 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 313 (1989); see also Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Environmental Policy-It is Time for a
New Beginning, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 111, 117-18 (1989).
113 One possible exception might be the Clean Water Act's construction grants program, which
authorizes federal grants for municipal wastewater treatment, see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1299 (1988),
but the effectiveness of that program, to be discontinued in 1994, has long been controversial. See
FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION-LAW AND POLICY 461-62 (2d
ed. 1990); see also Collins, supra note 40.
114 See generally Lead Poisoning Hearings, supra note 12, at 6 (describing how lead poisoning
affects low-income and minority communities).
liS See AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, THE NATURE AND EXTENT
OF LEAD POISONING IN CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS at V7-V16
(July 1988) [hereinafter ATSDR]; see also Marta Mahoney, Four Million Children At Risk: Lead
Paint Poisoning Victims and the Low, 9 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 46 (1990).
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not be explained on economic grounds. According to the ATSDR, black
children have a higher incidence of excessive levels of lead at all income
levels. 116
The absence of any systematic considertion of minority interests in
environmental protection has also likely effected the implementation of
environmental protection laws. The siting of hazardous waste treatment,
storage, and disposal facilities is a prime example. EPA is currently placing significant pressure on states to establish licensed hazardous waste
facilities with the capacity to handle hazardous wastes generated within
their borders. Under the federal Superfund law, EPA is required to deny
Superfund monies for remedial cleanups to states that do not meet these
"capacity assurance requirements."117 In choosing a location, the relevant state agency, as well as any private company involved, inevitably
must consider the political implications of the siting, including the potential for effective, local political opposition. 118 Few proposals survive the
volatile public review that often accompanies announcement of the recommended siting of a hazardous waste facility.119
Similar considerations are also likely to affect the development and
implementation of environmental enforcement priorities, including the
allocation of resources necessary for inspections of polluting facilities and
other factfinding investigations. Potential and realized programmatic
benefits and burdens are not the same. Congress may enact a statute, or
an agency may promulgate a generic rule, but neither detecting the violation of an environmental statute in the first instance, nor the subsequent
bringing of an enforcement action to compel compliance, automatically
116 See ATSDR, supra note 115, at V7-V13; see also Michael Weisskopf, Minorities' Pollution
Risk Is Debated, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1992, at A25 (summarizing ATSDR study: "For families
earning less than $6000,68 percent of black children have lead poisoning, compared with 36 percent
of white children. In families with incomes exceeding $15,000, the ratio spread to 38 percent of
black children and 12 percent of whites.").
117 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (1980), "[t]he President shall not provide any remedial
actions pursuant to this section unless the State in which the release occurs first enters into a contract or cooperative agreement with the President providing assurances [that] ... the State will
assure the availability of a hazardous waste disposal facility .... " Id. Facilities must "have adequate capacity for the destruction, treatment, or secure disposition of all hazardous wastes that are
reasonably expected to be generated within the State during the 20-year period following the date of
such contract or cooperative agreement and to be disposed of, treated, or destroyed." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(c)(9) (1980). The facilities must comply with federal environmental requirements and either
be within the State "or outside the State in accordance with an interstate agreement or regional
agreement or authority." Id. See John Holusha, The Nation: In Some Parts the Battle Cry is "Don't
Dump on Me", N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1991, § 4, at 5; New York Announces Lawsuit Against EPA for
Failure to Enforce Capacity Requirement, [Current Developments] Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No.2, at 1363
(Sept. 27, 1991); State, Industry Waste Minimization Urged as Part of Capacity Assurance Plans,
[Current DeVelopments] Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 103 (May 10, 1991).
118 See Hamilton, supra note 56.
119 Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous and Radioactive Waste
Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived Crisis 1 n.5 (Jan. 21, 1993) (unpublished
draft manuscript, on file with author).
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follows from passage of the law. 120
Whether, where, and when such detections occur, and whether,
where, and when they lead to enforcement actions, are the complex product of a host of "extra-legal" variables. Significant among these variables
are the complex relationships between those charged with monitoring
and enforcement responsibilities, the regulated community, those adversely affected by the violation, and any watchdog organizations overseeing the law's enforcement. 121 Just as these relational factors apply
when the substance of an environmental statute or regulation is fashioned in the first instance, they continue to influence enforcement priorities and policies at both the regional and local level where the impact
of an environmental law on environmental quality is ultimately
determined. 122
In the environmental law context, substantial resources are generally required to discover a violation of a prescribed environmental quality
standard, to bring an enforcement action against the violator, and to
monitor for future violations. However, given the sheer breadth of federal environmental protection laws, any comprehensive enforcement
scheme capable of ensuring compliance with the laws' requirements is
wholly impractical. The federal government never has, and likely never
will, allocate the resources necessary to guarantee such compliance. At
best, there has been a "half-hearted" commitment of federal resources to
the monitoring and enforcement of federal environmental restrictions. 123
Similarly, state governments have proven unwilling or unable to
commit the resources or efforts to ensure such compliance. 124 And, public interest organizations have never been capable of enlisting those resources necessary to bring the huge number of citizen suit enforcement
actions that would be required to fill the enforcement gap. Nor is it
clear, given the needs of other competing social welfare programs, that
the government's (or public interest organizations') failure to do so is
incorrect from either an economic efficiency or social justice perspective.
Be that as it may, what remains clear is that the allocation of those resources necessary to ensure actual compliance-whether the enforcer be
the federal, state, or local governments, or a public interest organization-is a significant determinant in the distribution of benefits and burdens ultimately realized. Compliance will necessarily be greater in both
120 Farber, supra note 99, at 63, 69, 75.
121 Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Continuing Relations in the Administrative Process, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 741, 742-43.
122 Professors Austin and Schill recount how the absence of effective enforcement of environmental standards in a minority community in Dallas, Texas, has resulted in the long-term exposure of
residents to unsafe levels of pollution from lead smelters. Austin & Schill, supra note 14, at 71.
123 Clifford S. Russell, Monitoring and Enforcement, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 243, 243-70 (paul R. Portney ed., 1990).
124 ld. at 248-53; see, e.g., Sonia L. Nazario, Pesticide Regulation, Mainly the States' Job, is Spotty
and Weak, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1989, at AI.
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those substantive and geographic areas where the government decides to
allocate its limited investigative and enforcement resources. And, in the
absence of such governmental initiative, compliance is more likely where
the community members possess the resources necessary to launch an
independent, citizen-based, enforcement effort.
Some evidence supports the claim that, because of inequities in the
distribution of enforcement resources, environmental quality is actually
less in minority than in nonminority areas. 125 This may be reflected in
less generous cleanup remedies,126 lower fines, 127 slo~er cleanups,128 or
125 See generally Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection-The Racial Divide in
Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at Sl-S12 ("A Special Investigation"). The National Law Journal report includes perhaps the most comprehensive empirical investigation to date
regarding the existence of a disparity, based on race or income, of EPA's allocation of enforcement
resources and leverage. It explains one of the possible reasons why environmental protection laws
may not have resulted in disproportionately favorable improvements in environmental quality for
racial minorities, notwithstanding that their communities tended to be disproportionately polluted in
the first instance. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text. The National Law Journal may,
however, overstate its findings in at least one significant respect. Rather than define white communities as those with an especially high percentage of white residents, and minority communities as
those with an equally high percentage of racial minority residents, the authors decided to divide the
communities in their sample "into four equal groups or 'quartiles,' ranging from those with the
highest to those with the lowest white populations." ld. at S4 (Methodology). They then compared
"the quartile with the highest white popUlation to the quartile with the lowest white population."
ld. For their Superfund data, the comparison was between communities with a white popUlation of
more than 98.3% and those with a white population ofiess than 84.1 %. For their enforcement data,
the corresponding percentages were 97.9% and 79.2%, respectively. For this reason, however, the
authors' use of the term "minority community" to describe the community with the lowest white
population is somewhat misleading; most of the communities falling under that label are in fact
predominantly white. However, the authors point out that, in light of segregated residential patterns, even communities with an 80% white popUlation may have a different character, or at least be
perceived different than communities that are nearly 100% white. ld.
126 See Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 125, at S2 (EPA chooses "containment" remedy-which
leaves hazardous wastes on site-more often than a treatment remedy-which seeks to eliminate the
waste's hazardous constituents-more frequently when the sites are located in nonwhite communities); Bullard & Wright, The Politics of Pollution, supra note 15 (contrasting governmental buyouts
of hazardous waste sites located in predominately white areas of Love Canal, New York, and Times
Beach, Missouri, with refusal to buyout residents in all-black town of Triana, Alabama); Lavelle &
Coyle, supra note 125, at S2 (when hazardous waste site located in community with greater-thanaverage minority population, it takes 20% longer from the time the site is discovered to the time it is
placed on the Superfund national priority list; EPA more often chooses controversial containment
remedy rather than the treatment remedy favored by most localities when site located in area with
greater-than-average minority popUlation); see also CLEAN SITES, HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES AND
THE RURAL POOR: A PRELIMINARY AsSESSMENT 17, 51-53 (1990) (hazardous waste sites in rural
poor communities are less likely to be placed on Superfund National Priority List, but once on that
list, no difference in cleanup achieved); John A. Hird, Superfund Expenditures and Cleanup Priorities: Distributive Politics or the Public Interest?, 9 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 455, 466, 478 (1990)
("EPA's site-specific decisions have been made more with the public interest in mind than with the
influence of key legislators." Thus, "preliminary examination suggests that the distribution of
Superfund sites is consistent with the objective of maintaining a high level of congressional
support. ").
127 Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 125, at S2 (EPA enforcement penalties between 1985 and March,
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more frequent violations of pollution control laws, 129 in areas where minorities reside in greater percentages than nonminorities. For example,
"nonattainment" areas under the Clean Air Act are primarily urban areas where minority populations are disproportionately high. 130 Additionally, among those reasons cited for the continuing problem of lead
poisoning in minority communities are that "federal efforts to create the
necessary infrastructure to abate high-priority lead hazards from paint
are still essentially at ground zero, and funding for abatement activities
in low-income communities is grossly inadequate."131 Finally, reportedly ninety percent of farm workers in the United States are persons of
color, and those workers are routinely exposed to pesticides in their work
because EPA has generally been unable to implement-as mandated by
the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act l32-the necessary
protective regulations for a majority of pesticides covered by the law. 133
In all events, racial minorities have had little influence on either the
lawmaking or priority-setting processes at any of the legislative, regulatory, or local enforcement levels. 134 They have not been well represented
1992, were 46% higher in communities with greater white populations, as measured against communities with greater-than-average minority populations; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
penalties 506% higher).
128 Id. at S4 (empirical evidence suggesting that minority and low-income communities wait
longer than white and wealthy communities for Superfund cleanup and that the disparity by race is
greater than the disparity by income).
129 See Lead Poisoning Hearings, supra note 12, at 4 (testimony of Dr. Robert BuIlard describing
how stringent city lead ordinance was "worthless" because of lack of enforcement in its application
to lead smelter poIluting minority community); Felicity Barringer, In Capital, No.2 River Is A Cause,
WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1991, at A24 (contrasting poIluted waters of Anacostia River in poorer minority communities with cleaner waters of Potomac in wealthier, nonminority communities); Barnaby
Dinges, Blacks Hit Hardest by Fly Dumping Epidemic, 19 CHICAGO REp. 1 (1990) ("Fly dumpingiIlegaIIy dumping tons of waste from a moving truck-has reached epidemic proportions in black
populated wards."). In a conversation this author had with EPA enforcement personnel in New
York City, one attorney volunteered that the agency tended to react less quickly to alleged environmental violations in minority communities. EPA's regional office in San Francisco recently surveyed
migrant labor camp drinking water systems and found "a higher noncompliance rate than for any
other category of small water systems." USEPA Fact Sheet-Cultural Diversity and Environmental
Equity-U.S. EPA Initiatives (Oct. 23, 1991) (copy on file with author).
130 Elliott, supra note 37, at 9-10; Wernette & Nieves, supra note 72; see supra notes 70-73, and
accompanying text.
131 Lead Poisoning Hearings, supra note 12, at 6 (testimony of Fred Krupp, Executive Director,
Environmental Defense Fund).
132 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
133 Ivette Perfecto & Baldemar Velasquez, Farm Workers: Among the Least Protected, EPA J.,
March/April 1992, at 13, 13-14; see also John P. Giasor, Note, Pesticide Safety Regulation Under the

Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act: Debacle at the Environmental Protection Agency,
1 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REp. 47 (1989) (criticizing as ineffective the implementation of the "Special
Review" administrative procedure authorized by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act); WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 3 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PESTICIDES AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES
at xi (1988).
134 ReiIly, supra note 36, at 17 (debate proceeds without participation of representatives of the
urban poor).
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among the interest groups lobbying and litigating before governmental
authorities on environmental protection issues. Nor have they been well
represented, especially at the national level, within those governmental
organizations actively involved in the relevant environmental processes.
Their voices have not been heard in the mainstream environmental public interest organizations that participate in the policymaking debates
and that, in the absence of governmental enforcement, are behind citizen
suits filling the void. Traditional civil rights organizations have historically had little interest in, and have infrequently become involved with,
environmental issues.13S At the same time, mainstream environmental
organizations have historically included few minorities in policymaking
positions. 136 In 1990, this fact prompted several members of various civil
rights organizations and minority groups to send a widely publicized letter to the national environmental public interest organizations charging
them with being isolated from minority communities. According to the
letter, none of the major environmental organizations was headed by a
minority, and there were virtually no minorities within their professional
staffs. 137
Minorities are likewise underrepresented in those parts of the national government that dominate environmental protection policymaking. The gains minorities have made in obtaining elective office are
almost exclusively at the state and local level. 138 However, it is at the
national level that environmental protection policy-including the allocation of its benefits and burdens-is largely determined by Congress, by
those federal agencies responsible for statutory implementation, and by
the federal courts of appeals through judicial review of agency decisions. 139 Very few minorities have been elected to Congress. Until this
13S Bullard & Wright, Environmentalism and the Politics of Equity, supra note 15, at 22-23;
Reilly, supra note 36, at 16; Paul Ruffins, Black America: Awakening to Ecology, WASH. POST, Dec.
24, 1989, at Cl.
136 Pat Bryant, Toxics and Racial Justice, Soc. POL'y, Summer 1989, at 48; Paul Mohai, Public
Concern and Elite Involvement in Environmental-Conservation Issues, 66 Soc. SCI. Q. 820, 821
(1985).
137 Maura Dolan, Race. Poverty Issues Grow Among Environmentalists, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21,
1990, at AI; Philip Shabecoff, Environmental Groups Faultedfor Racism, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 1, 1990,
at A2; see BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 15, at 4, 13; WEISBROD, supra note 23, at 118,
136, 139.
138 There are, at the very least, higher percentages of black elected officials at the local level
because of the emergence of black majority electoral districts. Whether, however, this increasing
number of black elected officials has resulted in a concomitant increase in the interests of blacks
being addressed in the political process is more questionable. See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of
Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory ofBlack Electoral Success, 89 MICH L. REV. 1077,
1116-34 (1991).
139 This is, of course, somewhat of an oversimplification. Delegations to state agencies of aspects
of federal programs are pennitted under most federal environmental laws, and states are otherwise
assigned significant implementing responsibilities by some of those laws. The state implementation
planning process under the Clean Air Act, the construction grants program and NPDES pennitting
program under the Clean Water Act, and the siting of hazardous and solid waste disposal and treat-
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year, there had been no blacks in the Senate for more than a decade, 140
and only a small number of blacks are elected Representatives in the
House. 141 Moreover, almost none of these few representatives has long
been a major player in congressional committees and subcommittees with
jurisdiction, and thus influence, over environmental protection issues. 142
Until relatively recently, they have not been especially active on environmental issues. 143
ment facilities under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act are three obvious examples. In
most instances, however, federal law establishes the general framework within which state and local
agencies must comply, leaving little room for the adaptation of programs more acceptable to each
community.
140 Carol Mosely-Braun (D. Ill.) was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1992 and is the first black
Senator since Ed Brooke of Massachusetts was defeated in 1978. Additionally, newly-elected Ben
Nighthorse Campbell (D. Colo.) is the first Native American to serve in the Senate in more than 60
years. The District of Columbia elects two "Senators," but because the District is not a state, neither
individual has formal senatorial status.
141 According to one survey, the number of black officeholders increased from 1469 to 6681 between 1970 and 1987. But in 1989, there were only 23 black members of Congress, representing
5.3% of the 435 members in the House (there were no black Senators). BULLARD, DUMPING IN
DIXIE, supra note 15, at 31; see generally BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS-A NATIONAL ROSTER (17th
ed., 1988). 1 1991 CoNGRESSIONAL STAFF DIRECTORY (Ann L. Brownson ed., 1991) (indicating
that in 1991 there were 31 minority representatives in the House, with 26 being members of the
congressional black caucus). Last year's elections, however, saw the number of blacks elected to the
House of Representatives increase to 39 with the addition of 16 new members. Jeffrey L. Katz,
Growing Black Caucus May Have New Voice, 51 CoNG. Q. 5 (1993). Additionally, nine newlyelected Hispanic representatives increase total representation for this minority group to 19 (including delegates from Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands), its largest ever. See Ines Pinto Alicea,
Hispanics Gain Members, Power, 51 CoNG. Q 7 (1993).
142 For instance, during the first session of the 102d Congress, Representative Edolphus Towns
(D. N.Y.) was a member of the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, and also of the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources of the House Committee on Government Operations; and Representatives William J.
Jefferson (D. La.) and Soloman P. Ortiz (D. Tex.), who is Hispanic, were members of the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Representative Craig A. Washington (D. Tex.) is currently the
fourth-ranking member of the Subcommittee on Energy and Power, and also serves on the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, both of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Additionally, Representative John Conyers (D. Mich.) is likely one of the most active minority
members of Congress on environmental matters in his current capacity as chair of the House Subcommittee primarily responsible for legislation that would elevate EPA to a cabinet agency. Representative John Lewis (D. Ga.) has likewise begun to take a more active role on environmental issues.
See infra note 143; 1 1991 CoNGRESSIONAL STAFF DIRECTORY (Ann L. Brownson ed., 1991); Key
House Member's Inaction Raises Pessimism About EPA Cabinet Bill Changes, INSIDE EPA, Feb. 28,
1992, at 11. Finally, such historical inaction may be changing as environmental justice concerns
grow with the increasing black membership in Congress. For example, at least one newly-elected
representative, Carrie Meek (D. Fla.), has become a member of the Subcommittee on Energy and
Water Development of the House Appropriations Committee.
143 See Henry Vance Davis, The Environmental Voting Record o/the Congressional Black Caucus, in MICHIGAN CoNFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 37, at 84-85. By contrast, their voting
record appears to be quite favorable to conservation interests. According to a League of Conservation survey for the years 1980-86, the Congressional Black Caucus "had the highest average of
support of conservation issues of any group surveyed." Id. at 81. Recent years have also witnessed
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The same pattern of underrepresentation and lack of interest appears to be repeated within the federal agencies principally charged with
implementing the federal environmental protection laws. These agencies
include the EPA, Department of the Interior, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and, within the Executive Office of the President itself, the Council on Environmental Quality, Office of Management
and Budget, and the Domestic Policy Office. For instance, within EPA
there is an Office of Civil Rights, but that Office has traditionally been
almost exclusively concerned with personnel issues. It has had virtually
no ongoing programmatic responsibility regarding the implementation of
any environmental protection laws within the agency's jurisdiction. l44
The number of minorities in policymaking positions at EPA is also reportedly small. 145
C.

Some Possible Explanations

Commentators offer several possible explanations for the relative absence of minority participation in the formation of environmental policy.
Deliberate exclusion and racial stereotyping are two possible causes. Another explanation is that minorities are relatively less interested in environmental protection issues and, accordingly, are less likely to
participate in those processes by which environmental policies are formulated. For instance, opinion surveys taken of blacks reportedly suggest
that they are less concerned about the environment and, even where concern does exist, are less likely to translate that concern into action digreater attention to environmental issues by minority members of Congress. In June 1992, Representative John Lewis (D. Ga.) introduced the Environmental Justice Act of 1992 (co-sponsored by
then-Senator AI Gore), intended to require EPA consideration of environmental justice issues. See
S. 2806, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (introduced by Sen. Gore (D. Tenn.), 138 CONGo REC. S7489
(June 3, 1992)); H.R. 5286, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (introduced by Rep. Lewis (D. Ga.), 138
CONGo REc. H4157 (June 4, 1992)). More recently, Representative John Conyers (D. Mich.), Chair
of the House Committee on Government Operations, announced that he would hold hearings on
"environmental racism." See Marianne Lavelle, Discrimination Probe Planned, NAT'L L.J., Sept.
28, 1992, at 1.
144 As described earlier, supra pp. 117-20, EPA has responded to recent claims of "environmental
injustice" by forming an Environment and Equity working group within the agency to determine
how the agency might improve its decisionmaking in this regard. Members of EPA's Office of Civil
Rights are actively participating in that process. This represents a significant expansion of that
Office's mandate, which has been traditionally confined to narrow matters relating to personnel. In
response to its own report on environmental equity, last year EPA created an Office of Environmental Equity within the agency.
145 In an internal agency memorandum, a high ranking EPA official recently described how
"[t]he Agency's minority profile and hiring history are ... not very laudable. The lack of minorities,
especially in positions of influence, almost certainly has contributed to the lack of insight into equity
issues that the workgroup found to be characteristic of both EPA and our traditional constituency
groups." See Hanley Memorandum, supra note 64. The memorandum further stated that "EPA has
proven resistant to the generic rationale for minority hiring for over two decades, and it is not clear
that the Reilly initiative [to promote such hiring] will change things in any fundamental way." ld.
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rected at those issues. 146 This difference in attitude, if it exists, might be
related to economic considerations. Faced with a choice between increased income or improved environmental quality, those with less income tend to vote in favor of the former. 147 To the extent that blacks
have disproportionately less income, they may not be willing or able to
promote restrictions that, while improving environmental quality, may
adversely affect the availability of employment or increase personal
expenditures. 148
Another proffered explanation is that because blacks and other minorities were historically excluded from many of the "public" opportunities to enjoy the natural environment, they may still feel socially
unwelcome in those areas. 149 Having been effectively denied the opportunity to experience and enjoy parks, wildlife, wilderness, and scenic rivers, blacks are less likely to be concerned about those resources or to
become politically involved in their protection. ISO In support of this theory, some commentators contend that more recent studies suggesting a
greater concern among blacks about environmental issues can, in fact, be
explained by the federal government paying greater attention to those
urban environmental issues touching more directly on the lives of black
americans, including the dangers of toxic and hazardous wastes. lSI
Finally, some commentators challenge altogether the premise that
146 Stephen R. Kellert, Urban American Perceptions of Animals and the Natural Environment, 8
URB. EcOLOGY 209,226 (1984) ("Urban blacks had significantly lower scores on every measure of
knowledge, appreciation, interest, and concern for wildlife and the natural environment. Moreover,
these differences remained significant and sometimes even increased after controlling for socioeconomic status, rural background, and farming occupation among the respondents' parents.");
Dorceta E. Taylor, Blacks and the Environment: Toward an Explanation of the Concern and Action
Gap Between Blacks and Whites, 21 ENV'T & BEHAV. 175, 176-80 (1989).
147 Robert Deacon & Perry Shapiro, Private Preference for Collective Goods Revealed Through
Voting on Referenda, 65 AM. EcoN. REv. 943 (1975).
148 Bullard & Wright, Environmentalism and the Politics of Equity, supra note 15, at 22-23; Eric
J. Dolin, Black Americans' Attitudes Toward Wildlife, 20 J. ENVT'L EDUC. 17, 19 (1988); Paul
Ruffins, Blacks Suffer Health Hazards Yet Remain Inactive on Environment, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27,
1989, at A3; UCC STUDY, supra note 53, at xii. Indeed, commercial interests have even exploited
this factor to defeat environmental initiatives. A business association opposed to a mandatory beverage recycling law in Washington, D.C., reportedly targeted blacks in advertisements that suggested
that wealthy whites were behind the law, which would impose disproportionate burdens on blacks.
See Paul Ruffins, No Deposit. No Return: How the Politics of Race Defeated the DC Bottle Bill,
RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T, Summer 1990, at 9.
149 Dolin, supra note 148, at 19; Taylor, supra note 146, at 186-89. A somewhat related explanation is that it might be because many minorities associate environmental organizations with the
"establishment" that "is seen by many as condoning racism," Julian Agyeman, Ethnic MinoritiesAn Environmental Issue?, 9 Ecos 2, 3 (1988), and, in some instances, even promoting racism by
endorsing environmental protection measures that have racially exclusionary effects. See supra note
82.
ISO Taylor, supra note 146, at 175, 176-80, 186-89, 192-93; see also Freeman, supra note 36, at
270-72.
lSI Judi A. Caron, Environmental Perspectives of Blacks: Acceptance of the "New Environmental
Paradigm", 89 J. ENVT'L EDUC. 21, 25-26 (1989).
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minorities, including blacks, have ever been less interested in environmental issues. ls2 Instead of evidencing a lack of concern, these commentators suggest that the lack of minority participation in environmental
issues reflects two other variables that have stifled the transformation of
that concern into social activism: ls3 a shortage of available resources (financial and political), and a lack of personal confidence in one's ability to
induce social change. Both are disproportionately found in environmental activists. ls4
This generic political access problem is exacerbated in the environmental law context because of the heightened difficulty of gaining access
to the various environmental protection debates that take place within
Congress, agencies, and the courts. These debates are invariably highly
technical and complex. Those who are either unwilling or unable to expend the resources to obtain the expertise necessary to participate in the
debate are effectively excluded from it. ISS
Many within minority communities may simply conclude that their
limited political and legal resources need to be devoted to other, more
pressing issues that compete for their time and attention (such as education, employment, and housing).ls6 Indeed, for many minorities, these
are the more important "environmental issues" ignored by mainstream
environmental groups. Not surprisingly, those who reside and work in
152 Of course, the mere appearance of little or no racial minority interest is likely, by itself, to
contribute to the problem. Public and private officials trying to decide where to locate an industrial
or waste treatment, storage or disposal facility may act in part on the mere appearance that racial
minorities possess less environmental consciousness and are more concerned about economic
growth. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 15, at 34-36; Bullard & Wright, Environmentalism and the Politics ofEquity, supra note 15, at 25. The path ofleast resistance is more often the one
selected when, as is the case for waste disposal facilities, public and private officials are seeking to site
an unpopular activity. See BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 15, at 4, 33; Rosemari Mealy,
Charles Lee on Environmental Racism . .. "Clean Environment Without Social Justice?", in PANOS
INSTITUTE, WE SPEAK FOR OURSELVES: SOCIAL JUSTICE, RACE AND ENVIRONMENT 8, 10 (Dana
Alston ed., 1990).
153 Paul Mohai, Public Concern and Elite Involement in Environmental-Conservation Issues, 66
Soc. SCI. Q. 821, 836 (1985).
154 Id. at 823-24, 836-37.
ISS See Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L.
REv. 1529, 1554 (1989); Peter C. Yeagar, Structural Bias in Regulatory Law Enforcement: The Case
of the
Environmental Protection Agency, 34 Soc. PROBS. 330 (1987); see also Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 171 (1988) (characterizing current regulatory system as being
dominated by "technocratic mumbo jumbo"); Michael J. Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on Civic Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1651, 1660 (1988); Peter H. Shuck, Regulation,
Non-Market Values, and the Administrative State: A Comment on Professor Stewart, 92 YALE L.J.
1602, 1612 (1983).
156 See SYDNEY HOWE, THE POTOMAC INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENT AND EQUITY 5 (1976) ("It is
a sick society that can beat and murder black people in the streets, butcher thousands of people in
Viet Nam, spend billions of dollars on arms and destroy mankind, and then come to the conclusion
that pollution is America's number one problem.") (quoting an unidentified member of the Black
Panther Party).

u.s.
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polluted urban areas place greater priority on the urban and industrial
environment than do those in the environmental community who have
tended to influence statutory priorities. 157 These urban residents and
workers tend to identify "environmental" progress with improvements in
housing, transportation, and air quality.158 As one minority environmentalist put it, "[i]f you're only concerned with clean streams and dolphins and whales, then that limited view of environmentalism smacks
people of color in the face. . .. We've been working on issues that affect
our environment-health care, lead in public housing, gang violence."159
IV.

PURSUING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

The pursuit of "environmental justice" within the context of environmentallaw is necessarily problematic because to define the issue exclusively in those terms misapprehends the nature of the problem in the
first instance. The distributional inequities that appear to exist in environmental protection are undoubtedly the product of broader social
forces. To be sure, features endemic to the ways in which environmental
protection laws have historically been fashioned may have exacerbated
the problem in the environmental context. But the origins of the resulting distributional disparities do not begin, nor will they end, with reforming either the structure of environmental protection decisionmaking
or the substance of environmental law itself.
Hence, while a series of measures within the environmental law
arena have the potential for redressing or, at least reducing, the existing
distributional inequities, their undertaking cannot be to the exclusion of
more broadly directed actions. Distributional inequities are very likely
rooted in past and present racial hostility, racial stereotypes, and other
forms of race discrimination. The vestiges of past discrimination may be
the greatest factor contributing to such disparities because of the selfperpetuating impact of such discrimination on racial minority economic
157 Reportedly, a survey in 1989 of 248 CEOs and their equivalent in mainstream environmental
groups showed that their interests lay primarily in the areas of conservation and preservation, with
the greatest amount of their resources being devoted to fish and wildlife and public land management. See Dorceta Taylor, Can the Environmental Movement Attract and Maintain the Support of
Minorities?, in MICHIGAN CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 37, at 41.
158 Robert Gottlieb & Helen Ingram, The New Environmentalists, PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 1988, at
14.
159 Safir Ahmed, Building A Rainbow Coalition, RIVERFRONT TIMES, Nov. 6-12, 1991, at 11
(quoting delegate at First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit); Safir Ahmed, Seeing Red Over the Green Movement, RIVERFRONT TIMES, Nov. 6-12, 1991, at 10 (quoting
Dana Alston, Director, Panos Institute) ("We refuse the narrow definition of environmentalism....
It's not just ancient, old-growth forests. It is not just the spotted owl and other endangered species.
Our communities and our people are an endangered species, too."); Paul Ruffins, Environmental
Commitment as if People Didn't Matter, in ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 9, at 51, (because
" 'environment' is seldom defined as the places where people live and work[, there are] large holes in
the way we deal with environmental regulation, the way we allocate money, and the way we establish environmental priorities.").
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and political power. These vestiges effectively deny minorities the autonomy to choose, either by purchase or through the ballot, the level of
environmental quality that they will enjoy or the amount of pollution
that they will tolerate.
With that significant, threshold caveat, important reforms can nevertheless be implemented within the existing environmental law framework. These reforms could both ameliorate the inequities currently
resulting from those laws and, more importantly, provide a much-needed
impetus to those seeking broader social reforms. These reforms include:
(1) providing environmental policymakers with a better understanding of
the nature and scope of the problem; (2) litigating the associated civil
rights issues as civil rights issues; (3) rethinking the substance of environmental law to take better account of distributional concerns; (4) reforming the structure of environmental policymaking to promote
minority involvement and interests; and (5) reclaiming the common
ground of environmentalism and civil rights. Each reform is discussed
below.

A.

Providing A Better Understanding

Both those who believe that distributional inequities exist in environmental protection, and those who remain skeptical, should be able to
join in one common recommendation: the need for better empirical investigation. To date, there have been relatively few technically rigorous
studies addressing the distributional issue. 160 Moreover, those that purport to be, such as the UCC study, advance significant conclusions but
not with especially high levels of statistical confidence. 161 Furthermore,
a separate study casts some doubt on the UCC's central finding concerning the role that race plays in the distribution of environmental benefits
and burdens. This study concludes that it is the ability of a community
to engage in collective action, rather than either race or income, that is
the statistically significant factor affecting facility decisions to expand existing hazardous waste processing capacity.162
EPA currently collects massive amounts of information relating to
environmental pollution and quality. The agency needs to correlate this
data with information already available on race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status. One obvious source of such data is the toxic release inventory, collected pursuant to the Emergency Planning and Community
160 Ken Sexton, Cause for Immediate Concern: Minorities and the Poor Clearly are More Exposed, EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1992, at 38, 39 (author is Director of EPA's Office of Health Research)
("[T]here is a paucity of data relating class and race to specific environmental pollutants and associated health effects.").
161 The uee findings were based on statistics with only a 90% confidence level. See supra note
56.
162 See Hamilton, supra note 56. Of course, race is not unrelated to collective action potential.
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Right-to-Know Act. 163 This inventory provides an authoritative accounting of all toxic releases throughout the country.l64 By joining this
data with existing census information, a nationwide correlation between
toxic releases and race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status should not be
difficult to derive. 165 One pending congressional proposal that would
help in this regard would require that the National Academy of Sciences
study the extent to which "minority and low-income populations in the
United States are disproportionately impacted by environmental health
hazards" and identify the extent to which existing Federal environmental
programs "adequately address the priority environmental needs of such
minority and low-income populations .... "166
To be sure, distinguishing the effects of socioeconomic status from
race will not be easy. Those two variables are themselves closely intertwined for the simple reason that the socioeconomic status of minorities
is plainly tied to their racial identity. And, as previously discussed, there
are a host of secondary factors ranging from diet, job-related stress, and
cultural practices that are likely to affect the degree of environmental
health-related risk. 167
The need for "better understanding" should not, however, be confined to formal empirical investigation. It must also include efforts aimed
at increasing awareness among both the general public and policymakers
about the potential for, and impact of, distributional inequities. As described by one minority environmentalist, who warned against addressing the problem by simply including more minority representation,
"[t]here is a need for diversity not only in the makeup of the organizations, but also in how these [environmental] issues are looked at.... For
environmental groups to consider issues like wetlands, global warming,
and wilderness protection as being the only environmental issues flies in
the face of reality."168

B. Litigating The Civil Rights Issue
Litigation provides another medium for addressing the distributional issue. Two basic litigation strategies are available. First, an administrative or judicial complaint could be filed on behalf of a minority
group for the purpose of preventing the siting of an unwanted facility in
163 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988); see supra note 63.
164 Cynthia H. Harris & Robert C. Williams, Research Directions:

The Public Health Service
Looks at Hazards to Minorities, EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1992, at 40.
165 A third-year law student at Washington University in St. Louis recently undertook such an
analysis in focusing on the relative amounts of toxies released in predominantly black and predominantly white neighborhoods in St. Louis. He found that substantially higher amounts oftoxies were
released per capita in the black neighborhoods. See supra note 63.
166 H.R. REp. No. 428, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1990) (quoting H.R. 3847).
167 Sexton, supra note 160, at 38-39.
168 David Hahn-Baker, The Need/or Cultural Diversity and Environmental Equity, in ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 9, at 5, 6, 8.
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its community, and the basis of the lawsuit could be the facility's noncompliance with an applicable environmental statute. The possibility of
distributional inequities would not be directly relevant to the substantive
merits of the administrative challenge or lawsuit. It would simply be the
reason why the lawsuit was necessary and why, for example, a minority
community should be entitled to a greater share of enforcement resources. Alternatively, the distributional inequities could provide the
substantive basis for the lawsuit by supporting a civil rights cause of action. In other words, the cause of action would itself derive from the fact
that a distributional inequity exists.
To date, minority plaintiffs appear to have favored the civil rights
approach. However, virtually none of those suits has been successful.
This is largely because existing equal protection doctrine, which has been
the focal point of most lawsuits, has not proved hospitable to the kinds of
arguments upon which environmental justice claims have depended. For
this reason, federal and state environmental laws may offer the best opportunity for minority plaintiffs to ameliorate environmental inequities.
Many of these statutes impose a panoply of procedural and substantive
limitations on those wishing to site polluting facilities, and many confer
private attorney general status on citizens aggrieved by actions that violate applicable statutory limitations. Plaintiff organizations with the necessary resources have consequently been quite successful in resisting
environmentally undesirable facilities under these environmental statutes. 169 To the extent that such legal and technical resources are made
available to minority communities, those statutes could likewise provide
a basis for considerable relief from distributional inequities. 170
169 See e.g., Marianne Lavelle, Plant Foes Light Legal Fires, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1993 at 1; Gerrard, supra note 119, at 57-88.
170 For instance, minority plaintiffs represented by the California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation successfully invoked the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) to persuade a state
trial court to set aside a county board decision to permit the construction and operation of a hazardous waste incinerator in a predominantly minority community. See El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua
Limpio v. County of Kings, [1991] 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,357 (Cal. App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 1991). The court ruled that the county's "Final Subsequent Environmental Impact Report" did
not satisfy CEQA's requirements because its analysis of air quality impacts and mitigation, agricultural impacts, cumulative air quality impacts, and project alternatives were all inadequate. Id., slip
op. at 2-10. Although most of the court's ruling was thus based on technical deficiencies unrelated
to environmental inequity per se, the court's further ruling that the county's failure to provide a
spanish translation of its formal environmental analysis violated CEQA's public participation requirement is directly related to equity concerns. Id., slip op. at 10. Because almost 40% of the
residents of the city in which the proposed incinerator was to be located are monolingual in spanish,
the court reasoned, the absence of such a translation deprived these residents of an opportunity for
"meaningful involvement" in the decisionmaking process. Id. Another successful environmental
case brought on behalf of minority residents was Houston v. City of Cocoa, No. 89-92-CIV-ORL-19
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1989), in which residents of a historically black neighborhood invoked provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1988), and the National Historic
Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1988), to protect the community from unwanted commercial
development. See Karl S. Coplan, Protecting Minority Communities with Environmental, Civil
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There is nonetheless substantial reason for continued emphasis on
civil rights litigation aimed at redressing distributional inequities in environmental protection. Burdens of proof are difficult to overcome under
existing doctrine, but if litigation efforts were to receive additional resources, some isolated successes might be achievable. In addition, the
cases brought so far have relied on only a few legal theories. Several
promising theories have not yet been fully explored and warrant greater
attention.
Perhaps more importantly, the real value of these lawsuits extends
beyond their ability to obtain a favorable decision in a given case. Indeed, the symbolic value of filing the lawsuit is itself substantial. The
mere filing of a formal complaint provides a very powerful and visible
statement by minorities regarding their belief that distributional inequities exist in environmental protection. The publicity that frequently surrounds the complaint's filing enhances public awareness of these
concerns and thereby serves an important educational function. Should,
moreover, a victory on the merits be achieved, the benefits could be tremendous. For many within the minority community it is extremely important that a formal judicial decision be obtained confirming their belief
that environmental protection presents its own unique civil rights issues.
1. Equal Protection and the Problem of Discriminatory Intent.Equal protection claims have been the principal focus of most environmental justice lawsuits brought to date. l71 One of the earliest cases raising an environmental justice claim in the siting context, Harrisburg
Coalition Against Ruining the Environment v. Volpe,l72 was a lawsuit
seeking to enjoin construction of two major highways through a public
park. Brought by minority residents of a neighborhood in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, the plaintiffs argued that the proposed highways denied
"black residents of equal opportunities to housing and recreation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."173 More particularly, the plaintiffs alleged that the siting of the highways through a park "was partly
motivated by an awareness that the predominant use of the [p]ark was by
Rights Claims, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 20, 1991, at 1. Another case currently pending in federal district
court in Tennessee provides an example of a challenge to a municipal siting decision grounded, inter
alia, on alleged violations of federal and state hazardous waste laws. See Complaint at 8, 11-12,
Bordeaux Action Comm. v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, No. 90·0214 (M.D. Tenn. filed Mar.
12, 1990). Finally, a group of black residents in Wallace, Louisiana, recently stopped the siting of a
$700 million wood, paper, and rayon plant in their community. See Suro, supra note 12.
171 See generally Godsil, supra note 14, at 410-16 (describing two cases raising equal protection
challenges against municipalities for discriminatory solid waste landfill sitings in which the courts
held the evidence insufficient to establish that racial discrimination motivated the challenged official
decisions).
172 Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruining the Env't v. Volpe, 330 F. Supp. 918 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
173 ld. at 921. The plaintiffs also claimed violations of the "Civil Rights Acts of 1871 and 1964."
ld.
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the black citizens of the City."174 The court rejected the constitutional
claim, finding insufficient evidence of either discriminatory motivation or
results. 175
Courts have since rejected similar minority plaintiffs' equal protection claims, but have done so notwithstanding showings of "discriminatory results" rather than because no such showing was made. In 1976,
the u.s. Supreme Court made it considerably more difficult for civil
rights plaintiffs to prevail on equal protection grounds by requiring that
such litigants establish a "discriminatory intent" or "purpose" underlying the challenged action. 176 This means that plaintiffs must show that
race "has been a motivating factor in the decision," and that the decisionmaker chose or reaffirmed a given course of action "because of" its
adverse effect on the group.177 While some courts have diminished the
harshness of this requirement by allowing for a burden shifting once disparate treatment is shown, the defendant can overcome such a showing
by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive for its behavior,
which the plaintiff can in tum overcome only by a showing of mere
pretext. 178
As commentators have long contended, the practical effect of the
required "discriminatory intent" element is devastating to most civil
rights claims because of the inordinate difficulty of proving the subjective, motivating intent of a decisionmaker. 179 In addition, where many of
the existing distributional inequities are more proximately traceable to
the self-perpetuating vestiges of past discrimination, the equal protection
Id. at 926.
Id. at 926-27.
176 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976).
177 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan HollS. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1977); see Godsil,
supra note 14, at 409-10.
178 Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104
HARV. L. REV. 817, 861-63 (1991). On the other hand, it is not a legitimate nondiscriminatory
motive to rely on a stereotypical judgment about a racial class, even if such an inference might be
supported by rational statistics. For instance, government officials or industrial owners cannot claim
that their neutral motive was the desire to site the facility in a location where people were less likely
to complain or less likely to mount political opposition, if their judgment that such was the case in a
particular area was based on the race of the residents. It is no defense that such an inference might
be supported by a rational statistical inference. Such a judgment is an impermissible racial classification. See id. at 862 (citing Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1531 (7th Cir. 1990».
179 Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional
Adjudication, 52 N. Y.U. L. REV. 38, 114-17 (1977); Kenneth L. Karst, The Costs ofMotive-Centered
Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163 (1978); Randall L. Kennedy, Competing Conceptions of "Racial Discrimination": A Response to Cooper and Graglia, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 93, 98 (1991);
Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth ofIntent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (1989); cf Elizabeth
Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under Title VIL· United States Board of Governors v.
Aikens, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1201 (1982). There are, of course, exceptional cases where the evidence is
somehow fortuitously available to make the required showing. See Dowdell v. Apopka, 511 F. Supp.
1375 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (disparities in water, stormwater drainage in black/white neighborhoods motivated by discriminatory intent).
174
175
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test simply cannot be met. For instance, a community may become a
"minority community" only after a hazardous waste facility is located
there, because of the decrease in property values caused by that siting.
A case decided just a few years after the Supreme Court's imposition
of the "discriminatory intent" requirement illustrates the pitfalls of reliance on equal protection litigation theories. In Bean v. Southwestern
Waste Management Corp.,IS0 minority plaintiffs sought to enjoin the siting of a solid waste disposal facility within their community in Houston,
Texas. The claim was brought, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, against the
state agency that issued a permit for the facility and against the operators
of the facility itself, and alleged an equal protection violation. The approved solid waste site was within 1700 feet of a predominantly black
high school with no air conditioning and was also close to a predominantly black residential neighborhood. Plaintiffs' claim rested on two
theories: (1) that the state agency's "approval of the permit was part of a
pattern or practice by it of discriminating in the placement of solid waste
sites,"ISI and (2) that the state agency's "approval of the permit, in the
context of the historical placement of solid waste sites and the events
surrounding the application, constituted discrimination. "IS2
The district court denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction,183 and the complaint was ultimately dismissed ls4 on the ground
that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the decision to grant the permit
was attributable to an intent to discriminate on the basis of race. ISS
While the court commented that some of the statistical data "at first
blush, looks compelling,"IS6 it ultimately concluded that the data was
not sufficient to establish discriminatory intent. The size of the census
tracts made it difficult to show that the approved sites were located in
minority neighborhoods. Notably, while the census tracts encompassed
predominantly white populations (thus undermining the discrimination
charge), the approved sites were specifically located in minority neighborhoods within those larger census tracts.187 However, the small
ISO

482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd without op., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
[d. at 677.
182 [d. at 678.
183 The judge who first denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction went out her way,
however, to comment on the potential strength of plaintiff's claim of disparate impact and to suggest
how plaintiffs might establish their entitlement to relief in the subsequent permanent injunction hearing. That same judge, who is a minority, was not the judge who later presided over the permanent
injunction hearing. According to the lawyer who represented the plaintiffs in Bean, the transfer
occurred shortly before the hearing. Linda McKeever Bullard, Remarks at the Proceedings of the
First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit (Oct. 1991) (notes available from
author).
184 The court initially denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, providing the plaintiffs with an
opportunity to proceed with discovery. 482 F. Supp. at 680.
185 [d. at 677-80.
186 [d. at 678.
187 [d. at 677.
181
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number of prior solid waste sites made it difficult to draw statistical inferences,188 and the location of the sites could be linked to the location of
industry. 189
Not long after Bean, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, in NAA CP v. Gorsuch, 190 rejected on similar grounds a constitutional challenge to the proposed siting of a PCB
disposal facility. The plaintiffs in this class action alleged that the fact
that the county in which the facility would be located "has the highest
percentage (at least 63.7%) of minority residents of any county in North
Carolina was at least one factor in deciding to place the PCB dump
there." 191 The district court denied the plaintiffs' request for preliminary
injunctive relief, concluding that there was "little likelihood that plaintiffs will prevail on the merits." 192 According to the court, "[t]here is not
one shred of evidence that race has at any time been a motivating factor
for any decision taken by any official-state, federal or local-in this long
saga." 193
Minority plaintiffs' claims in Georgia met a similar fate in 1989. In
East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning &
Zoning Commission,194 the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia rejected an equal protection challenge to a local zoning board decision to permit the location of a privately owned landfill in
a predominately black community. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' evidence of disparate impact was inadequate because it relied heavily on decisions made by local authorities other than the zoning board,
and because there was no evidence of "improper racial animus."195 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 196
Finally, and even more recently, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, in R.LS.E v. Kay, rejected an equal protection challenge to the siting of a regional landfill in an area populated
primarily by blacks. 197 The court agreed that the county's siting of landfills over the past twenty years had had a disproportionate impact on
racial minority communities 198 but, relying on Arlington Heights v. Met188 [d. at 678 ("[T]here are only two sites involved here. That is not a statistically significant
number.").
189 [d. at 679 ("But those sites, the Assistant Attorney General argues persuasively, are located in
the eastern half of the city because that is where Houston's industry is, not because that is where
Houston's minority population is.").
190 No. 82-768-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 1982).
191 [d., complaint at 2. The plaintiffs also raised a Title VI claim based on the allegedly adverse
effects of the PCB facility on minority property values. [d. at 12.
192 [d., slip op. at 9.
193 [d. at 9-10 n.8.
194 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989).
195 [d. at 885-87.
196 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989).
197 R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992).
198 The court examined the racial composition of both the locations of the proposed, and three
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ropolitan Housing Development 199 and Washington v. Davis,2OO ruled that
a showing of disproportionate impact is not enough; to prevail the plaintiff must go further and show discriminatory intent.201 The Fourth Circuit affirmed. 202
The existing case law, therefore, does not give minority plaintiffs
much reason to be optimistic about their likelihood for successfully challenging particular actions or decisions based on an equal protection theory. What is even more striking about the uniformity of these rulings,
however, is that they contrast quite sharply with decisions in a closely
analogous area where courts have been far more receptive to equal protection claims. Specifically, these other cases have involved the disparate
provision of municipal services. In that context, some federal courts
have more readily inferred discriminatory intent based on the government's knowledge of disparate impacts stemming from the provision of
governmental services. 203 Theoretically, there is no obvious reason why
those two types of cases should be treated differently by the courts.
What is necessary to establish discriminatory intent should be the same
whether the stakes are the benefits of municipal services or the burdens of
undesirable environmental cleanup facilities such as landfills. One likely
reason for this disparity in the case law may be that the judiciary perceives significant differences in the harm-shifting implications that arise
with the type of relief sought in each kind of case.
When municipal services are at stake, the problem can seemingly be
remedied by providing better or more services to those bringing the action. Significantly, there is not an immediate perception that the parties
are involved in a zero-sum game where winners and losers must necessarily offset each others' gains and losses. Raising services for one group
does not, in all likelihood, mean that the services of others will be compromised. 204 However, where the question is how environmental risks
previously sited, landfills in the county, which has a population of approximately 50% black and
50% white. The court found that 100%, 95%, and 100% of the residents living in the immediate
vicinity of the three previous sites were black, and that 64% of the residents within a half-mile radius
of the proposed site were black. ld. at 1148.
199 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
200 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
201 768 F. Supp. at 1149. The court also concluded that, notwithstanding the disproportionate
impact on black communities, a "[c]areful examination of the administrative steps taken by the
Board of Supervisors ••. reveals nothing unusual or suspicious. To the contrary, the Board appears
to have balanced the economic, environmental, and cultural needs of the County in a responsible and
conscientious manner." ld. at 1149-50.
202 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992).
203 See Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1986); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698
F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983); Baker v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Fla. 1986). All
three of these cases, and how the courts inferred the requisite element of discriminatory intent based
on government official knowledge of existing disparities in municipal services, are discussed in Godsil, supra note 14, at 416-20.
204 Of course, to the extent that government revenues are fixed, this may not be true. But it is the
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are to be distributed or redistributed, a court is more likely to perceive
the necessary tradeoffs. In short, the risks must go somewhere. Under
these circumstances, courts seem far less willing to invoke the equal protection clause to dictate to local government how harms such as environmental risks must be redistributed in a community, perhaps because the
redistribution would so directly implicate the quality of the environment
enjoyed by those in the community wielding great political and economic
influence. 205 Hence, the success of civil rights litigation for the pursuit of
environmental justice will likely tum not just on whether attempted theories avoid the doctrinal burdens posed by equal protection, but also on
whether the courts are less troubled by (or at least less focused on) the
harm-shifting implications of the judicial relief being sought.

2. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act: The Search for Federal Funds to
Avoid the Intent Limitation.-One option not yet well explored by civil
rights plaintiffs in the environmental context is Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Title VI provides that: "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance. "206
The principal advantage of Title VI over equal protection is that
courts have not required a showing of discriminatory intent in the Title
VI context; disparate impact has been enough. Hence, in Lau v. Nich01s,207 where non-English-speaking Chinese students had allegedly been
deprived of equal educational opportunities, the Supreme Court concluded that Title VI had been violated because of the discriminatory effect of the challenged school policies "even though no purposeful design
is present."208 Although the Court's subsequent ruling in Regents of
University of California v. Bakke 209 casts some doubt on the continuing
validity of this aspect of Lau, 210 the Court later reaffirmed, in Guardians
judicial perception of the practical consequences, rather than the actual consequences, that likely
explain the differences in judicial approach.
205 Cf. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10
(1985) ("effective remedies for harm attributable to discrimination in society in general will not be
granted to blacks if that relief involves a significant cost to whites.").
206 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988); see generally Charles F. Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution:
A Regulatory Modelfor Defining "Discrimination", 70 GEO. L.J. 1 (1981) (discussing interpretations
of Title VI and the role of regulatory agencies in effecting its purposes).
207 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
208 Id. at 568.
209 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
210 See id. at 318-19 (opinion of Justice Powell), 351-52 (opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, concurring in part and dissenting in part); see generally
CHARLES F. ABERNATHY, CIVIL RIGHTS CONSTITUTIONAL LmGATION-CASES AND MATERIALS
516-19 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the o~inions in Bakke and analyzing their treatment of the discriminatory effects test set out in Lau).
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Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission,211 that discriminatory intent is not required under Title VI where that had been the view historically endorsed
by applicable federal agency regulations implementing the statutory
mandate. Notably, EPA's Title VI regulations embrace a discriminatory
effects test. 212 It is also well settled that Title VI provides an implied
private right of action on behalf of individuals who have suffered discrimination deemed unlawful by Title VI.213
There are, however, two limitations to Title VI. Although each is
significant, Title VI's reach in the environmental protection arena remains potentially great. The first limitation is that Title VI's nondiscrimination mandate applies only to "any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."214 Thus, while covering all federal agency
activities, nonfederal actions are within Title VI's mandate only when a
sufficient federal financial nexus can be established. Federal financial
assistance for environmental protection is extensive, however, particularly assistance to state governments. Virtually all federal environmental
laws, including those dealing with hazardous waste,21S toxic substances,216 water pollution control,217 and clean air218 provide funding to
state programs. These state programs make many of the decisions that,
when not initiated by the federal government, effectively determine the
distribution of benefits and burdens from environmental protection at the
state and local level. In 1986, for example, federal grants to state governments made up forty-six, thirty-three, and forty percent of the state
budgets for air, water, and hazardous waste programs, respectively.219
211 463 U.s. 582, 584 & n.2 (1983), cerL denied, 463 U.S. 1228 (1983).
212 40 C.F.R. § 7.35 (1991).
213 463 U.S. at 593-95.
214 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
21S Both the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. II 1990) offer large amounts of federal
monies. CERCLA authorizes expenditures for the cleanup of inactive and abandoned hazardous
waste sites. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9611 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). RCRA provides substantial financial assistance to states. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6931 (assistance for "the development and implementation
of authorized State hazardous waste programs"), 6947-6948 (assistance for development and implementation of federally approved state solid waste management plans), 6949 (assistance to rural communities for solid waste management facilities) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
216 Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2627 (1988) (authorizing "grants to States for the
establishment and operation of programs to prevent or eliminate unreasonable risks within the States
to health or the environment which are associated with a chemical substance or mixture and with
respect to which the Administrator is unable or is not likely to take action under this chapter").
217 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1252(c) (comprehensive programs), 1254(b)(3), (g)(l) & (g)(3)
(research, investigation, training, and information), 1255 (research and development), 1256 (for pollution control programs), 1259 (training grants and contracts), 1281(g) (publicly owned treatment
works), 1281(h) (privately owned treatment works), 1282 (treatment works) (1988).
218 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7405, 7505, 7544 (1988).
219 U.S. EPA, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC COSTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: 1981-2000, at 9 (1988).
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Given this significant federal financial assistance to state environmental
programs, the potential reach of Title VI is correspondingly great.
The second Title VI limitation is remedial in nature. Until recently,
it appeared fairly well settled that in the absence of a showing of discriminatory intent, equitable relief was the only remedy available to redress a
Title VI violation. 220 Just this past Term, however, the U.S. Supreme
Court unanimously ruled, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools,221 that a damages remedy is available in implied private rights of
actions brought under Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of
1972.222 Because the language of Title IX was expressly modeled after
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, and because the Court has frequently
relied on constructions of one in interpreting the other,223 it would seem
fair to assume that a damages remedy is now generally available for Title
VI violations, even absent a showing of discriminatory intent.
To date, however, there has been very little reliance on Title VI in
any of the litigated cases. 224 EPA has likewise not exploited its Title VI
responsibilities as it could to redress distributional inequities. There are
a host of ways that EPA could implement Title VI's nondiscrimination
mandate in the agency's disbursement of federal pollution control funds.
A relatively modest measure would be for EPA to require the recipient of
the funds to make a showing that the funds are being disbursed according to racially neutral criteria. A more aggressive approach would be to
require a further showing that racial minority groups are proportionately
represented among the ultimate beneficiaries of the federal funds. Such a
showing could include proof that the "neutral" distribution of federal
funds in no manner perpetuated the vestiges of past racial discrimination
within the relevant community. For instance, in the case of a federally
funded wastewater treatment facility, EPA would need to be satisfied
that the community'S sewage treatment program provides service to minority communities (e.g., connections to sewage treatment plants) equal
to that provided to nonminority communities in the affected area.
EPA's decision to playa reduced role under Title VI seems to have
220 In Guardians, four justices embraced the view that Title VI, as affected by administrative
regulations, forbids both intentional discrimination and "effects" discrimination, and provides a
damages remedy for each type of transgression. 463 U.S. 582, 615-34 (Marshall, J., dissenting), 63545 (Stevens, Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (1983). Justice White provided the fifth vote in
favor of the former proposition, but concluded that the damage remedy was available only upon a
showing of discriminatory intent. Id. at 593.
221 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
222 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988).
223 E.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. at 594 (opinion of White, J.); Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-703 (1979).
224 In those isolated instances when a Title VI claim has been raised in the complaint, such as in
Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruining the Env't V. Volpe, 330 F. Supp. 918 (M.D. Pa. 1971), and
NAACP V. Gorsuch, No. 82-768-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 1982), the plaintiffs do not appear to
have pressed the issue very far. In Gorsuch, for example, plaintiffs raised a Title VI claim in their
complaint but did not argue the issue in their memorandum in support of an injunction.
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been made very early on in the agency's history. During hearings before
the United States Commission on Civil Rights in 1971, just a few months
after EPA's creation, EPA officials acknowledged that the agency was
taking a narrow view of Title VI's relevance to its work. 225 Specifically,
EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus testified that there were "limitations" on what a "regulatory agency" such as EPA could do consistent
with its statutory mandate to achieve pollution control.226 In particular,
Ruckelshaus explained that any denial or termination of pollution control funding to a community would cause that community to violate pollution control standards, but without necessarily prompting the
community to change its racially discriminatory practices:
[I]t would not be a penalty against that community at all and it would be no
incentive for them to go ahead and do what we were asking them to do,
because in fact they might consider it a benefit not to have to spend that
additional money for the construction of a sewage treatment plant which
our matching fund would force them to spend. 227

Administrator Ruckelshaus acknowledged that EPA could couple its denial of federal funding, pursuant to Title VI, with a lawsuit against the
community to compel its compliance with water quality standards, but
contended that such an approach was problematic because it would necessarily cause further delay in the accomplishment of national pollution
control objectives pending resolution of the litigation. 228 For this reason,
Ruckelshaus concluded, absent a "clear violation" of Title VI, "the needs
of the community" would have to be taken into account "in the determination of what mandate receives priority" in a particular case. 229
In a 1975 report on federal civil rights enforcement, the United
States Commission on Civil Rights faulted EPA for its lack of effort
under Title VI. The Commission found that EPA
had not yet fully recognized ... [its] ... responsibility to ensure that conditions such as the lack of fair housing laws, absence of a fair housing agency,
or the existence of exclusionary zoning ordinances do not contribute to the
effective exclusion of minorities from EPA assistance by aiding their exclusion from a community which has applied for or receives EPA
assistance. 23o

In response to EPA's defense of its Title VI efforts, the Commission
225 u.s. CoMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 146-56 (June
14-17, 1971) (testimony of William Rucke1shaus, Administrator of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency).
226 ld. at 147.
2271d.
228 ld. at 151 ("there are circumstances that can arise where it would seem that our ability to
achieve the purposes of the Civil Rights Act flies in the face of our mandate by Congress to insure
that water quality standards are complied with.").
229 ld. at 1007 (Draft Statement of William D. Ruckelshaus before U.S. Civil Rights Commission, June IS, 1971).
230 6 U.S. CoMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, 598-99 (1975) (footnote omitted).
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stated more categorically that "EPA provides funds to municipalities
without taking adequate steps to ensure that they are in compliance with
Title VI, and . . . EPA has been lax in executing its Title VI mandate."231 The Commission further concluded that "unless EPA takes
positive steps to insure an end to the systemic discrimination which has
resulted in inadequate sewer services in many minority communities,
EPA will be responsible for perpetuating that discrimination. "232
Whatever the merits of EPA's decision in 1971 to deemphasize its
civil rights responsibilities, it now seems appropriate for both EPA and
those parties litigating environmental justice claims to take the steps necessary to ensure a fuller realization of Title VI's environmental protection mandate. Indeed, Title VI has been an effective means of redressing
distributional inequities in other related areas. For instance, minority
plaintiffs have successfully utilized Title VI in administrative and judicial
actions to challenge the siting of federally financed highways, prisons,
hospitals, and other facilities that would tend to have a substantial adverse or beneficial impact on their communities. 233 The gist of these Title
VI legal complaints has been the disproportionate impact that the facility, or its absence, would have on a minority community. Such a showing, while not sufficient by itself to prove a Title VI violation, shifts to the
recipient of federal funds the burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the siting decision. In many instances, the recipient of the federal financial assistance meets this challenge. 234 Quite
often, however, the practical effect of this burden-shifting is to prompt
the recipients of federal financial assistance to settle a Title VI claim.
There is no apparent reason why similar Title VI claims might not be
raised against federally financed facilities that impose disproportionate
environmental risks on minority communities or, conversely, fail to provide such communities with a commensurate level of environmental
benefits.
231
232

ld. at 591.
ld. at 595. EPA responded to the Commission report by stating that "the report should give
more recognition to the fact that EPA is essentially a pollution abatement agency and, as such, is to
be distinguished from an agency principally concerned with community development." ld. at 586
(Letter from Carol M. Thomas, Director, EPA Office of Civil Rights, to John A. Buggs, Staff Director, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (July 8, 1975». EPA further asserted that "[w]e do not consider it as our major responsibility to see to the sewering of minority communities nationwide
irrespective of pollution abatement considerations." ld. at 589. In reply, the Commission characterized EPA's position "as tantamount to saying that, in the face of environmental considerations, EPA
may see fit to weaken or even abandon civil rights standards." ld. at 591 (U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights' reply to Carol M. Thomas' letter of July 8, 1975).
233 See, e.g., North Carolina Dep't of Transp. v. Crest Street Comm. Council, 479 U.S. 6 (1986)
(highway); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., 689 F.2d 1161 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1052 (1983) (hospital).
234 E.g., Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ohio
1984) (defendants rebut plaintiffs' showing of disparate impact in siting of highway by articulating
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the siting determination).
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Indeed, there is Title VI precedent virtually on point that has largely
been ignored by those bringing environmental justice claims. These are
cases where minority plaintiffs have invoked Title VI to redress distributional inequities associated with the availability of environmental amenities or quality resources, such as public parks and water quality
treatment facilities. Courts have upheld Title VI challenges to these federally financed programs based on their racially disparate effects.235
In sum, Title VI provides a possible basis for civil rights litigation to
redress environmental inequities and is an approach that warrants
greater emphasis and attention. Most importantly, by using Title VI as a
vehicle for these suits, the bugaboo of proving discriminatory intent can
be avoided. And, while Title VI's federal financial assistance requirement is not insignificant, the fact that states receive so much of their
environmental budgets from the federal government suggests that that
limitation may not be much more practically significant than equal protection's threshold requirement that there be "state action." Finally,
courts may be more willing to grant relief under Title VI than under
equal protection because the focus of the lawsuit is, at least superficially,
the provision of governmental benefits as opposed to the redistribution of
environmental risks. To that extent, a Title VI lawsuit is more analogous
to equal protection challenges concerning provision of municipal services
(which have fared substantially better in the federal courts) than to those
suits which more overtly seek a judicial redistribution of "harmful" environmental risks.

3. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 u.s.c. § 1982: The
Need to Bridge Housing and the Environment.-Two other potentially
useful, but even less explored, civil rights causes of action are Title VIII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968236 and 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Title VIII
makes it unlawful "[t]o discriminate against any person in the ... sale or
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status or national origin."237 Section 1982 provides that all United States citizens
"shall have the same right ... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property."238
There are several threshold advantages to Title VIII's nondiscrimination mandate. Like a claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, and unlike a constitutional equal protection claim, no showing of
235 See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (black neighborhoods not being provided with same level of municipal services as white neighborhoods). As described above, similarly based equal protection claims have been successfully advanced. See supra
note 207 and accompanying text.
236 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1988).
237 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1988).
238 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988).

839
HeinOnline -- 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 839 1992-1993

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

discriminatory intent is required under Title VIII. An unjustified, racially discriminatory impact may alone be sufficient to establish a Title
VIII violation. 239 Furthermore, unlike either Title VI or the equal protection clause, but like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,240 Title
VIII applies to some purely private conduct. A showing of federal financial assistance is not, therefore, always necessary. Finally, as under Title
VI, the focus of a Title VIII complaint is the provision of governmental
services, which seems to be a more favorable context within which to
bring a civil rights claim.
The ultimate usefulness of Title VIII's nondiscrimination mandate
in redressing environmental inequity largely turns, however, on the
meaning of "provision of services or facilities" within Title VIII. In particular, what kinds of "services or facilities," and what types of providers, fall within the statute's scope? The statutory language suggests some
potentially significant limitations. For example, it does not purport to
bar discrimination in the distribution of services or facilities generally.
Instead, Title VIII proscribes only those "dealing with the specific
problems of fair housing opportunities"241 and, even more specifically,
the "services or facilities" restricted are those "in connection with [the]
sale or rental of a dwelling."242 Clearly, some issues related to environmental quality would more easily fit within this analytical framework
than others. 243
The significance of Title VIII's command that all federal agencies
"administer their programs and activities relating to housing and urban
239 Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); see generally JOSEPH G. COOK & JOHN L. SOBIESKI, JR., 3
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS 'il19.07 (1992) (examining the extent to which discriminatory effects alone
can constitute a violation of Title VIII).
240 Pub. L. No. 88·357, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1976 &
Supp. 1991».
241 Vercher v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 454 F. Supp. 423, 424-25 (M.D. Pa. 1978) ("To say that
every discriminatory municipal policy is prohibited by the Fair Housing Act would be to expand
that Act to a civil rights statute of general applicability. . .. We do not believe the act was intended
to have such a wide scope.").
242 Laramore v. Illinois Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443, 452 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (rejecting
Title VIII challenge to siting of a new baseball stadium that would compel black residents to move
because the alleged discriminatory act was not in connection with a "sale or rental of a dwelling").
The structure of the statutory language also lends some support to the contention that the kinds of
"services or facilities" to which Title VIII applies are limited to those "of any person in the business
of selling or renting dwellings, or of any employee or agent of any such broker, agent, salesman, or
person." 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (1988).
243 Courts have indicated that Title VIII extends to "services generally provided by governmental
units such as police and fire protection or garbage collection." Southend Neighborhood Improve·
ment Ass'n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984). But they reject the notion
that Title VIII "was designed to reach every discriminatory act that might conceivably affect the
availability of housing." Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419, 423·24 (4th Cir. 1984)
(denying relief to plaintiff who claimed that hazard insurance was a "service in connection with
dwellings" and, therefore, could not be provided discriminatorily).
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development in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes of [Title
VIII]" turns on similar considerations. As with Title VI, EPA has historically adhered to a narrower construction of that command than the
United States Commission on Civil Rights. EPA concluded early on that
its pollution control programs did not "relat[e] to housing and urban
development" within the meaning of Title VIII.244 Hence, EPA has declined to withhold "treatment works construction grant assistance from
communities which are charged with having exclusionary zoning ordinances precluding location of low cost and medium income housing
within their jurisdictions."245 The Civil Rights Commission faulted EPA
for failing to apply a "liberal construction of Title VIII" and for failing
to recognize that "EPA's program for sewage treatment is essential for
the development and maintenance of urban areas, and thus it is clear that
even within the strictest meaning of the term 'program relating to housing and urban development,' it is covered by Title VIII."246
Whether Title VIII could play a significant role in helping litigants
establish distributional equity in environmental programs is not yet clear.
It is not a cause of action upon which environmental plaintiffs have historically relied, and EPA has not yet given any indication that it will
soon adopt a broader view of its Title VIII responsibilities. One significant case raising a Title VIII claim in the environmental justice context is
El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. Chemical Waste Management,
Inc., now pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California.247 The complaint in that case, which challenges
the proposed siting of a hazardous waste disposal facility in a minority
community,248 raises several civil rights claims, including a Title VIII
cause of action that advances a fairly expansive interpretation of the
"provision of services or facilities" language in Title VIII.249
Finally, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 provides an alternative basis for a civil
rights lawsuit based upon interference with property rights. Although
244 U.s. CoMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 230, at 589 (quoting Letter from Carol M.
Thomas, Director, EPA Office of Civil Rights).
245Id.
246Id.
247 EI Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc., No. C-91-2083 (B.D.
Cal. filed July 8, 1991).
248 Id.; see Miles Corwin, Unusual Allies Fight Waste Incinerator, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1991, at
A3.
249 Complaint at 28, El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc., No.
C-91-2083 (B.D. Cal. filed July 8, 1991). Although the federal court has yet to rule on this claim, a
state trial court in a parallel state law proceeding recently issued a favorable decision on one of the
plaintiffs' claims. EI Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, [1991] 22 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,357 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1991). The state court agreed with the
plaintiffs that the county had violated an applicable state environmental law by failing to provide the
general public with a copy of the statutorily required description of the proposed facility's environmental effects in Spanish because that was the principal language of many of those residing in the
community that would be adversely affected by the facility. Id.
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Section 1982's proscription is generally less comprehensive than Title
VIII, unlike Title VIII, it extends to the mere "hold[ing]" of real and
personal property. Section 1982 also applies, although not without debate, to both private and public action.250 Because, moreover, the u.S.
Supreme Court has previously intimated that Section 1982 "might be
violated by official action that depreciated the value of property owned
by black citizens,"251 it would at least seem to offer a theoretical basis for
bringing an environmental justice claim based on a civil rights law. 252
While the issue remains unsettled, Section 1982's primary limitation is
that federal courts are likely to require a showing of discriminatory intent under this statute. 253
C.

Rethinking The Substance Of Environmental Law To Take Better
Account Of Distributional Concerns

A better accounting of the distributional implications of environmental protection wi11likely also require substantive reform of the federal environmental laws. This is in part because EPA has historically
resisted embracing a distributional mandate in its enforcement of these
laws. The agency has consistently viewed "sociological" concerns, such
as distributional impacts, as outside the purview of its purely "technical"
mandate of establishing technically effective, and economically efficient,
pollution control standards. 254
Notwithstanding EPA's apparent assumption, the agency's failure
to take distributional equity into account has not resulted in a neutral
distribution of the benefits and burdens of environmental protection. In250 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb,
481 U.S. 615, 616 (1987); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
251 City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 123 (1981).
252 The viability of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 as a legitimate basis for such a claim is outlined in Colquette
& Robertson, supra note 14, at 198-99. A 42 U.S.C. § 1982 claim is included in the complaint
pending in Bordeaux Action Comm. v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, No. 3-90-0214 (M.D. Tenn.
filed Mar. 12, 1990), which challenges the siting of a sanitary landfill in a minority community.
253 The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1982, but the
Court has ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 requires a showing of discriminatory intent, see General Bldg.
Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 382-91 (1982), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982
share common origins. See, e.g., Terry Properties, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.), 799 F.2d 1523,
1536 (lith Cir. 1986); see generally, CHESTER J. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS § 48 (2d
ed. 1980 & Clark Boardman Callaghan Supp. 1991).
254 EPA's belief that these matters were outside the proper scope of the agency's mandate is
reflected in the agency's response in the early 1970s to the United States Commission on Civil
Rights' criticism of the agency's failure to do more to enforce civil rights laws through environmental laws. See supra notes 225-32 and accompanying text. A similar attitude is evident in a highranking agency official's response in 1987 to claims that hazardous waste sites were disproportionately located in racial minority communities. The EPA Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and
Emergency Response reportedly stated that "[t]here's no sociology to it. It's strictly technical." See
Charles Lee, Toxic Waste and Race in the United States, in MICHIGAN CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 37, at 25 (quoting Michael Weisskopf, Rights Group Finds Racism in Dump Siting,
WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 1987, at A7 (quoting J. Winston Porter».
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deed, the agency's position may instead have facilitated a distributional
skewing unfavorable to those persons, such as racial minorities, less able
to influence the legislative, regulatory, and enforcement agendas that ultimately determine who will receive the benefits and burdens of a particular legislative initiative.
Two kinds of statutory reforms could address this problem. One
possibility would be to require formal agency consideration of the distributional impacts associated with a particular decision. Such consideration could be required where the agency establishes rulemaking agendas,
promulgates implementing regulations, and determines enforcement priorities. It could also be required when the agency allocates grant monies
and technical assistance. The second, more ambitious, reform would be
to establish equitable benchmarks that would provide standards for judging discretionary agency determinations with significant distributional
impacts. 255
Neither substantive reform is as radical a proposal as it might seem.
Indeed, there is plenty of applicable precedent for infusing distributional
factors into the fashioning of legal standards and agency priorities. For
example, environmental impact statements, prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act,256 have long included discussions of
the socioeconomic effects of certain proposed federal actions. 257 Somewhat ironically, the notion of a more overt distributional inquiry finds
precedential support in legislation now pending that would require federal agencies to consider the impact of their actions on private property
rights. 258 Whatever the merits of that legislative proposal, which opponents fear will chill the promulgation of needed environmental regulation,259 the racial minority status of a person would certainly seem to be
255 Representative John Lewis (D.Ga.) and then·Senator, now Vice President, AI Gore introduced environmental justice legislation in the 102nd Congress which included both types of provisions. See supra note 143. That legislation would have required the identification of "environmental
high impact areas," mandated the allocation of enforcement resources to those areas, provided technical assistance funding to allow local communities to participate in decisionmaking processes, and
imposed a moratorium on the siting or permitting of any new toxic chemical facility in an area
identified as "high impact" under specified circumstances. See S. 2806, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992);
H.R. 5326, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
256 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
257 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (1991); but cJ. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear
Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 776 (1983) (NEPA not concerned with human health and welfare per se, but
only with effects on either resulting from a "given level of alteration of our physical environment or
depletion of our natural resources.").
258 See 137 CoNG. REc. S13,963 (daily ed. Sept 13, 1991) (debate on the amendment proposed by
Senator Symms which would require federal agencies to consider whether proposed agency action
will "take" private property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution).
259 See Tom Kenworthy & Bill McAllister, Environmentalists See Roadblock in "Taking" Appraisals, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1991, at A23.
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a more compelling trigger for such a particularized distributional accounting of agency environmental decisionmaking.
Even more broadly, federal and state natural resource laws have
routinely included substantive distributional standards. The purpose of
these standards was generally to ensure a fair distribution of the nation's
natural resource wealth. It should be equally acceptable to ensure that
the risks associated with environmental protection are also fairly distributed. For example, homestead,260 mining,261 mineralleasing,262 and reclamation laws263 historically included acreage limitations. These
limitations were intended to promote a fair and equitable distribution of
public resources. Neither economic efficiency, nor the maximization of
resource production, was the overriding statutory goal to the extent that
it interfered with these distinct distributional objectives.
More recent congressional enactments in the natural resources area
can likewise be viewed as having an overt, progressive distributional objective. Historically, many of the nation's public land laws subsidized
commercial exploitation of natural resources both by failing to charge
market prices for public resources and by failing to restrict resource exploitation methods that were environmentally destructive. 264 To the extent that more recent legislative revisions have sought to correct each of
these problems, the distributional impact has been potentially progressive. For example, the increased economic rents captured by the government from competitive bidding and increased royalty rates are available
for redistribution in government welfare and service programs. 265 And,
the curtailment of environmentally destructive activities on the public
lands may reduce those negative externalities suffered disproportionately
by certain groupS.266
260
261
262
263
264

Homestead Act of 1862, 43 U.S.C. §§ 211, 212 (repealed 1976).
General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1988).
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 184 (1988).
Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 375 (1988).
GEORGE C. COGGINS, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 2.02 (1992).
265 See, e.g., Federal Onshore Oil & Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, tit.
V, subtit. B, §§ 5101-13, 101 Stat. 1330-256 to 1330-263; Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-451, 96 Stat. 2447 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1757 (1988»; Federal
Coal Leasing Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083 (codified at 30 U.S.C.
§§ 181-287 (1988». Of course, as in the case of environmental law, commercial interests that have
benefitted from natural resources laws that, in effect, confer below-market-cost benefits on them
(e.g., low cost water, grazing fees), have also quite successfully resisted legislative proposals to eliminate these subsidies completely. See GEORGE C. COGGINS & CHARLES F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL
PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 128-33, 693-94 (2d ed. 1987).
266 Adam Rose et aI., Assessing Who Gains and Who Loses From Natural Resource Policy-Distributional Information and the Public Participation Process, 15 RESOURCES POL'y 282, 287 (1989)
(concluding that "[t]he groups with the highest probability of a loss [from allowing coal mining in a
particular national forest] are those in the low and middle income groups since environmental damage tends to be spread more evenly than gains in personal income"). Of course, for the same reason
(e.g., allocation of enforcement resources) that there seems to have been a gap between potential and
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There are also instances where Congress has specifically sought to
ameliorate the adverse distributional impacts caused by a shift in the nation's natural resource policies. For example, Congress enacted the
Powerplant Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (PIFUA) "to reduce the
importation of petroleum and increase the Nation's capability to use indigenous energy resources," especially coal.267 In recognition of the fact
that such a dramatic shift in resource emphasis would have severely adverse socio-economic impacts on certain regions of the country, Congress
authorized substantial federal financial assistance to those areas. 268
Water transfer policy provides another illustration of how distributional concerns are more routinely accounted for in natural resources
law. Especially in water-scarce western States, water transfers are taking
on new urgency as existing water uses, such as irrigation, do not necessarily reflect the highest and best use of the resource (often needed in
urban areas). Accordingly, additional sources must be found to satisfy
demand. For this reason, some states are now allowing existing water
rights users to contract for the "transfer" or sale of their rights to others,
even when such transfers require a diversion of the waters to a different
place. Because, however, such transfers may adversely affect third parties who, as neither seller nor buyer, are unable to affect the contract's
terms, both the federal government and interested states are studying the
possibility of regulating such transfers in a way that takes into account
third-party effects. 269
realized benefits in other areas of environmental law, see supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text,
that same phenomenon could occur in the implementation of these natural resource laws.
267 42 U.S.C. § 8301(b)(1) (1988); see generally Daryl Robertson, The Powerplant and Industrial
Fuel Use Act of 1978: Fuel Replacement, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 214 (1979) (discusses the provisions of PIFUA and explores the disadvantages of the Act, including its disproportionate impact on
certain consumers).
268 See 42 U.S.C. § 8401 (1988).
269 See NATIONAL REsEARCH CoUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, WATER
TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992) [hereinafter
WATER TRANSFERS]; Charles T. Du Mars & Michele Minati, New Mexico Water Law: Determining
Public Welfare Values in Water Rights Allocation, 31 ARIz. L. REv. 817 (1989). The National
Research Council of the National Academy of Science has identified several categories of third-party
effects of water transfers, including "the environment," "ethnic co=unities and Indian tribes," and
"nonagricultural rural co=unities." WATER TRANSFERS, supra at 5. The National Research
Council recently studied third-party effects of a series of specific proposed water transfers.
The extent to which distributional factors can properly be taken into account under existing
state law, however, is still unsettled. For instance, a New Mexico state trial court recently held
unlawful a proposed change of water use from livestock and irrigation to use for a ski resort, because
its third-party impacts made the change not in the "public interest." The court reasoned that "[t]he
Northern New Mexico region possesses significant history, tradition and culture of recognized value,
not measurable in dollars and cents," that "[t]he relationship between the people and their land and
water is central to the maintenance of that culture and tradition," and that "[t]he imposition of a
resort-oriented economy ... would erode and likely destroy a distinct local culture which is several
hundred years old." Sleeper v. Ensenada Land & Water Ass'n, No. RA 84-53(C), slip op. at 7-8
(N.M. Dist. Ct., July 2, 1985). The state court of appeals, however, reversed the trial court on the
ground that public interest considerations were irrelevant to the lawfulness of the proposed change
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In one notable respect, moreover, the nation's natural resources
laws take explicit account of their distributional impact on an identifiable
minority group: Native American tribes. The Bureau of Indian Affairs
within the Department of the Interior is charged, inter alia, with honoring the United States' treaty obligations and general fiduciary duties to
Native American tribes. The existence of that formal voice within the
executive branch may, in part, explain why some federal environmental
protection laws articulate specific exemptions aimed at ameliorating
some of the distributional impacts that those laws may have on Native
Americans, particularly when those laws adversely affect some of their
subsistence ways of life. 270
There are also state analogues in the natural resource area. Some
state land use planning requirements incorporate "fair share" doctrines,
requiring that certain cities share in the need to supply lower income
housing. 271 California's coastal zone law, for example, originally imposed affordable housing requirements. 272 The result was that lower income households benefitted most from a state land conservation law. 273
in water use. See Application of Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988), cert. quashed, Ensenada Land & Water Ass'n v. Sleeper, 759 P.2d 200 (N.M. 1988); see also Shannon A. Parden,
Note, The Milagro Beanfield War Revisited in Ensenada Land & Water Assn v. Sleeper-Public
Welfare Defies Transfer of Water Rights, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 861 (1989). I am indebted to Dan
Tarlock for bringing this latter case to my attention. See Tarlock, supra note 102, at 880-81.
270 See, e.g., Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 u.s.c. § 3120 (1988) (requiring federal agency to consider the impact on "subsistence uses" prior to making any land use decision); Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 V.S.C. § 668(a) (1988) (permitting otherwise
unlawful activities "for the religious purposes of Indian tribes"); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539(e) (1988) (permitting otherwise unlawful activities when taken by "any Indian, Aleut, or
Eskimo who is an Alaskan Native who resides in Alaska"); Fur Seal Management Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1153 (1988) (exemption for Aleuts, Eskimos, and Indians); Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1371(b) (1988) (exemptions for Alaskan natives); National Forest Management Act, 16
U.S.C. § 543(f) (1988) (protection of traditional Indian uses in scenic areas); see also American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988) (promoting the exercise of traditional religions
by the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians). This is not, of course, to suggest
that similar problems of inequity do not exist on Native American reservations. Tribal governments
have long complained that they should have greater authority and autonomy to protect the natural
environments within their reservations. See Mary Beth West, Natural Resources Development in
Indian Reservations: Overview of Tribal, State. and Federal Jurisdictions, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 71
(1982); Richard A. Du Bey et al., Protection of the Reservation Environment: Hazardous Waste
Management on Indian Lands, 18 ENVTL. L. 449 (1988); Douglas A. Brockman, Note, Congressional Delegation of Environmental Regulatory Jurisdiction: Native American Control of Reservation
Environment, 41 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 133 (1992). In 1990, Congress enacted the
Indian Environmental Regulatory Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-408, 104 Stat. 883 (1990), for
the express purpose of granting monies to tribal governments to enhance their ability to develop and
enforce environmental protection laws.
271 Mandelker, supra note 47, at 2-3 (citing Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975».
272 Id. at 4.
273 David E. Hansen & S.1. Schwartz, Income Distributional Effects of the California Land Conservation Act, 59 AM. J. AGR. ECON. 294 (1977). California subsequently modified the program,
transferring it to local governments, with the far less demanding requirement that housing develop-
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California law also generally requires that the state consider the effect of
zoning ordinances on low income housing needs. 274
Significant opportunities exist for including such distributional analysis in formal EPA decisionmaking. For example, EPA has not traditionally accounted for equitable considerations in its risk assessment
analysis, which has become the linchpin of agency decisionmaking in recent years. Thus, while EPA's practice has resulted in risk minimization
in the aggregate, the agency has not generally taken into account how
that risk is specifically being spread.275 The end result may be a policy
determination that minimizes the risk to society overall, but which does
so at the expense of an identifiable segment of the population that ultimately receives more than its "fair share" of the risks being distributed. 276 Such equitable concerns are a proper and necessary factor to be
considered in most EPA policy decisions and rulemakings.
Indeed, rulemakings provide another opportunity for a more systematic consideration of distributional factors. EPA and other federal
agencies are already required by various executive orders to account for
the distributional impact of their rules on business,277 family,278 states
rights,279 and private property.280 EPA could conduct similar accountment in the coastal zone include low and moderate income housing "whenever feasible." See
Mandelker, supra note 47, at 4; Robert A. Johnston et al., Inclusionary Housing in the California
Coastal Zone, 18 CoASTAL MGMT. 15 (1990).
274 Mandelker, supra note 47, at 5 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65863.6 (West 1992)).
275 Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative
Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562, 593 (1992).
276 EPA has recently acknowledged that the agency's programs fail to "address cumulative and
synergistic effects or multiple pathways of exposure." EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REpORT,
supra note 64, at 18, 20 ("never been a consistent EPA policy to address equity issues with respect to
racial and income groups"), 27 ("[H]igh risk populations in some cases have been overlooked."). Of
course, some of the environmental laws do strive to take account of persons (like the elderly,
asthmatics) who might be especially sensitive to certain pollutants. The Clean Air Act, for instance,
requires EPA to set standards at a level that can protect such sensitive persons from the adverse
effects of air pollution. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1988 & Supp. II 1990); Lead Industries Ass'n v.
U.S. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1146, 1152-53, 1156-60 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980).
And, in that context, EPA has taken into account the distribution of risks within a particular exposed popUlation in setting emission standards for hazardous pollutants such as benzene. See 54
Fed. Reg. 38044, 38046 (1989). But, even then, there has been no distributional accounting of the
potential for cumulative risk aggregation in certain communities as a result of agency determinations
under various laws and regarding various kinds of environmental risks. Professor Donald Hornstein
has recently published a forceful critique of EPA's comparative risk analysis based on its inability to
take account of such equitable factors. See Hornstein, supra note 275, at 600-04.
277 Exec. Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981); see Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas
H. Ginsburg, White House Review ofAgency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1075 (1986); Peter L.
Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and the Office of Management and Budget in
Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986). For a much less flattering view of the operation of this executive order, see Robert U. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1991).
278 Exec. Order No. 12,606, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,188 (1987).
279 Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (1987).

847
HeinOnline -- 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 847 1992-1993

NOR THWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

ings of the impact that its rules have on racial minorities and low-income
persons. Indeed, in 1985 the u.s. Department of Energy (DOE) did just
this, undertaking a study to assess how an EPA proposal to reduce
leaded gasoline use would effect minority and low-income households.
The DOE report concluded that a reduction
[W]ould benefit minority and low-income households proportionately more
than the overall U.S. population. . . . This is due to the relatively large
share of minority and low-income households living in [Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area] central cities, as well as to the relatively large share of
these households with small children."281
The report also considered the relative economic impact of the EPA proposal on those same communities, concluding that its costs would be
"comparatively high" for the "Hispanic and other minority (except
black) and low income households that do own vehicles [because they]
have a greater than average share of vehicles that require leaded
gasoline. "282
State and local siting decisions are also amenable to a more routine
consideration of distributional factors. In Texas, for instance, the state
Department of Health reportedly requires landfill permit applicants to
include socio-economic information concerning the proposed site. 283
N ew York City's Charter now requires that rules for the selection of sites
for city facilities "further the fair distribution among communities of the
burdens and benefits associated with city facilities."284 Other jurisdictions, such as the State of New York, 285 are considering the adoption of
similar programs. 286
Finally, because EPA is currently contemplating greater utilization
280
281

Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (1989).
K. ROSE ET AL., ARGONNE NAT'L LABORATORY, EFFECTS ON MINORITY AND Low-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS OF THE EPA PROPOSAL TO REDUCE LEADED GASOLINE Use 30 (1985) (multiyear research program, concerning minority energy consumption and expenditures, conducted by
Argonne National Laboratory at request of Department of Energy's Office of Minority Economic
Impact).
282 ld. at 1. For those without a vehicle, however, the costs would accordingly be disproportionately lower. ld.
283 The state adopted this approach in the aftermath of the Bean litigation, which involved an
unsuccessful equal protection challenge brought against the siting of a landfill in a predominantly
minority Houston community. See supra notes 180-89 and accompanying text. See also Bullard &
Wright, Environmentalism and the Politics of Equity, supra note 15, at 30.
284 Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, "Fair Share" Siting of City Facilities, N.Y. L.J., June
21, 1990, at 1 (quoting N.Y. City Charter § 203(a»; Tsao, supra note 14, at 375-77.
285 See supra note 12.
286 A recent student note discusses the potential benefits of creating a state "super review" "oard
that "would be responsible for selecting an inventory of candidate sites for commercial hazardous
waste facilities," taking "into consideration the racial and socioeconomic makeup of the potential
candidate sites. If existing commercial hazardous waste facilities are sited disproportionately in minority communities, the board can remove sites that are predominantly minority from the inventory." Godsil, supra note 14, at 426. Another possibility, discussed in the same student note, is to
create a federal cause of action under RCRA requiring states and localities to demonstrate "environ-
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of decentralized approaches, such as market incentives, for the accomplishment of environmental quality objectives, the need for overt distributional inquiry may be all the more pressing. Reliance on market
incentives reduces the distributional inequities that result because of the
enhanced political access that some enjoy to centralized decisionmakers
under a command-and-control regulatory regime. But, rather than eliminate inequities, this approach more likely just shifts the cause for such
distributional inequity away from a relative absence of political power at
the national level to the relative absence of market power at home. For
instance, the distribution of pollution under a market system of transferable pollution rights will tend to replicate existing income and property
distributions that, to the extent that such distributions are themselves the
product of racial discrimination, will only continue to produce and exacerbate inequitable results. 287 The likely outcome is the further occurrence of pollution "hot spots" in racial minority communities and low
income neighborhoods. 288
This problem could be addressed in a number of ways. One approach would be to impose certain substantive limitations on the market
system to guard against the likelihood of inequitable distributions. For
instance, there could be fixed limits on the amount of pollution that
would be permitted within anyone geographic community. Another approach would be to work within the market system by leveling the playing field. Communities identified as lacking in resources might, for
example, be allocated vouchers that would allow them to bargain more
effectively within the pollution rights market. 289
mental necessity" to overcome a plaintiff's showing that the siting of a proposed facility would result
in a disparate impact on minority communities. ld. at 421-25.
287 Errol Meidinger, The Politics of "Market Mechanisms" in
Air Pollution Regulation: Social Structure and Regulatory Culture, in DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE POLICY 15()'86 (Allan Schnaibert et al. eds., 1986).
288 See Manley W. Roberts, Comment, A Remedy for the Victims ofPollution Permit Markets, 92
YALE L.J. 1022, 1027-28 & n.40 (1983); see also Ackerman & Stewart, supra note ISS, at 188-89.
289 This approach might be criticized, however, on the ground that those with fewer resources
would have little meaningful choice even under this scheme but to allow themselves to be bought off
by those seeking to pollute in their neighborhoods. A related proposal, susceptible to the same
criticism, would be to conduct a so-called "reverse auction" in which communities would indicate
how much they would be willing to be paid to accept an otherwise environmentally undesirable
facility. Under that scenario, the owner of a hazardous waste facility would not have to comply with
applicable environmental laws, but would additionally have to purchase, in effect, the right to locate
the facility in a particular community. See Herbert Inhaber, Of LULUs, NlMBYs, NlMTOOs, 107
PUB. INTEREST 52 (1992). Such a regulatory regime might, of course, create a host of perverse
incentives, pitting a locality'S desire to regulate with its desire to increase municipal coffers. See
Vicki Been, "Exit" As A Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 594 (1991).

u.s.
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D.

Reforming The Structure Of Environmental Policymaking To
Promote Minority Involvement

Apart from the substance of environmental law, serious consideration should be given to reforming the structure of environmental policymaking so as to enhance minority access to relevant decisionmaking
fora. Governmental and nongovernmental organizations that currently
dominate the process need to promote minority participation in the dialogue and, even more fundamentally, they need to educate themselves
about minority concerns. 290 It is not enough to provide minorities with
an opportunity to adequately represent their own interests because correction of distributional equities is not, and should not be, the sole responsibility of racial minorities. Those in positions of authority, whether
or not they happen to belong to a racial minority, have an independent
responsibility to work toward the fair distribution of environmental benefits and burdens.
Mainstream environmental groups need, therefore, to work towards
better representation of minorities within their organizations, both as
members and as professional employees. 291 They should likewise lend expertise to local communities in need of financial, legal, and technical
assistance,292 and should also target those communities in their educational programs. 293 There are currently a host of new environmental organizations, more directly involved with environmental issues of special
290 At least during the recent "transition" between administrations, the Clinton administration
made an effort to do so, by including two very prominent spokespersons on environmental justice
matters, as members of the EPA "transition team." See Marcia Coyle et al., Washington Brie/Justice Voices, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 28, 1992, at 9.
291 Paul Ruffins, Blacks and Greens, RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T, Summer 1990, at 5. It is probably fair to say that the mainstream environmental groups are currently more aware of the past
inattention to minority concerns and now at least profess an intent to do better in their future. See,
e.g., John H. Adams, The Mainstream Environmental Movement, EPA J., Mar'/Apr. 1992, at 25;
Have Minorities Benefitted .. . ? A Forum, EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1992, at 32-33 (comments of Michael
Fischer, Executive Director of the Sierra Club).
292 Taylor, supra note 157, at 43-52. A recent example of just such financial assistance occurred
when the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the National Wildlife Federation
defrayed the expenses associated with a representative from a local minority community organization to travel to Washington, D.C. and present testimony before Congress on the impact of lead
poisoning. See Lead Poisoning Hearings, supra note 12, at 4 (testimony of Rev. James R. Josey, on
behalf of The Kingsley Park Coalition). Additionally, NRDC recently brought a lawsuit, along with
several minority groups, challenging the siting of a sewage treatment plant in a poor neighborhood in
Harlem, New York. See Suro, supra note 12. Another laudable example was a recent program,
sponsored by the National Conference of Black Lawyers, to instruct legal service lawyers and others
on the workings of environmental protection laws. See Challenging Race Discrimination in Environmental Law and Policy Making (Dec. 3, 1992) (unpublished conference materials, on file with
author).
293 See, e.g., Maralee Schwartz & Dan Balz, Activists Challenge Lawmakers' Claims on Environment, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1990, at A9; Samara F. Swanston, Underrepresentation 0/ Minorities in
Environmental Law Can Be Remedied, NEW YORK STATE BAR AsS'N ENVTL. L. SEC. J., Feb.IMay
1991, at 7, 8.
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concern to racial minorities, which could greatly benefit from the mainstream groups' sharing of available resources. 294
Those minority environmental organizations, however, have served
notice that any relationship with the mainstream organizations must be
as "equals."295 To that end, those in the mainstream environmental
movement need to appreciate what they can learn from the newer minority environmental organizations. 296 They need to increase their awareness and understanding of the potential for inequity in the allocation of
benefits and burdens from those environmental protection programs that
they have historically supported. 297 They also need to guard against
their natural tendency, based on their highly successful fundraising programs, to exploit the "environmental justice" issue in a manner that
enhances their own fundraising efforts at the expense of minority organizations possessing far fewer resources. 298
The challenge of opening up existing fora to minority involvement is
substantial. Many in the minority community continue to harbor a deepseated distrust of both mainstream environmentalists, whom they view as
too closely tied to industry,299 and of a federal government that some
294 These include: Black Environmental Science Trust ("to increase the participation of African
Americans in the shaping of the environmental future"); Center for Environment, Commerce, and
Energy ("promoting the efficient use of natural resources through education and activism, which
seeks to represent minority and low income communities that suffer disproportionately from environmental hazards"); Community Environmental Health Care ("provides technical assistance to
African-American, Latino and low-income communities in New York City to organize around environmental issues that affect them"); Native Americans for a Clean Environment ("works with Native American communities and Tribal governments on a variety of environmental issues ranging
from waste management to protection ofland and water"); and South West Organizing Project ("a
multi-racial, multi-issue grassroots community organization whose mission is to empower the disenfranchised Southwest to realize social and economic justice"). See PANOS INSTITUTE, supra note
152, at 38-39; see also Austin & Schill, supra note 14, at 77-79 (describing emergence of minority
grassroots environmentalism that is "anti-bourgeois, anti-racist, class conscious, populist, and participatory," and that "attacks environmental problems as being intertwined with other pressing economic, social, and political ills"); Grass-Roots Groundswell, EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1992, at 45-53 (six
articles describing rise and progress of "grass-roots" environmental movement).
295 Ahmed, Seeing Red Over the Green Movement, supra note 159, at 10 (quoting Dana Alston,
Director, Panos Institute) (" 'We refuse a paternalistic relationship.... If you are to form a partnership with us, it will be as equals.' ").
296 For a thoughtful discussion of the kind of relationship needed between lawyers representing
local communities and those clients, see Cole, The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, supra note
14, at 41-47.
297 Brian Bloom, Pollution Prevention & Grassroots Activism, RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T, July
1990, at 7-8, 10; Victor Lewis, A Challenge to the Environmental Movement, RACE, POVERTY &
ENV'T, Apr. 1990, at 4, 19.
298 Remarks of Dana A. Alston, Director, Panos Institute, at the proceedings of The First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit held during October 1991 in Washington,
D.C. (notes available from author).
299 See Eric Mann, Environmentalism in the Corporate Climate, 5 TIKKUN 60, 61 (1991) ("[T]he
institutional matrix is frightening: corporate polluters derail environmental regulations in Congress;
corporate pollution managers make lucrative deals that neither restrict polluters nor effectively clean
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view as a mere "spokesperson for industry."300 Environmental organizations are not infrequently characterized as ignoring the legitimate needs
of minority communities, valuing those needs less than they do wildlife
protection and the preservation of scenic beauty.30l
In addition, some minority commentators have suggested that both
mainstream environmental organizations and governmental officials bear
some direct responsibility for the ultimate siting of environmentally risky
facilities in minority communities. After all, it is because these same organizations have been so successful in resisting the siting of such facilities
in their own neighborhoods (and in those of their membership), that
many of the facilities have instead been located in minority neighborhoods. 302 Some minorities have also expressed suspicion of population
control proposals, commonly advocated by mainstream environmental
groups, based on their perception that those proposals are principally
intended to limit the growing populations of persons of color.303
Finally, the advantages of a less centralized policymaking regime
need to be re-examined in light of environmental justice concerns. As
described above, the highly centralized nature of environmental policymaking may be one of the most significant structural causes of existing
distributional inequities. 304 There is certainly reason to suspect that racial minorities today possess more real political power in many localities,
and in certain state governments, than they do within the federal government. If true, that would add yet another way in which the disadvantages of centralized authority, and the advantages of decentralized
decisionmaking, may historically have been underestimated. 305
up the toxins; government agencies set up ostensibly to protect the environment become captive to
the polluters and pollution managers; and corporate boards of directors co-opt the most malleable
and greedy environmentalists to clean up their image-but not their products.").
300 Former Governor Calls for Rethinking at EPA to Combat Effects of "Environmental Racism ",
[Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 1655, 1656 (1991) (quoting Toney Anaya,
former Governor of New Mexico) ("But if it's not going to be protective of the environment, then all
we're doing is giving cabinet status to a spokesperson for the industry and we're just not interested in
doing that.").
301 For example, two Ute tribes in Colorado are currently in a conflict with environmentalists
because of the tribes' desire to construct a federally funded water diversion project. Environmentalists are concerned about the impact of the project on the endangered Colorado squawfish. Dirk
Johnson, Indian's Water Quest Creates New Foe: Environmentalists, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1991, at
Al (" 'Environmentalists like to wrap themselves in Indian blankets when they can,' said Charles
Wilkinson, a law professor at the University of Colorado, who works with both groups. 'And there
is some natural alliance. But that alliance comes into collision in the face of such terrible poverty in
Indian country.' ").
302 Austin & Schill, supra note 14, at 78.
303 See supra note 298.
304 See supra pp. 125-36.
305 Several commentators have suggested that decentralized regimes offer significant advantages
over the typical centralized command-and-control regulatory approach, including the empowerment
oflocal communities and the fostering of democratic values and cultural diversity. See Gerald Frug,
Why Neutrality?, 92 YALE L.J. 1591, 1600 (1983); Stewart, supra note 103, at 1545-46; see also
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Reclaiming The Common Ground Shared By Environmentalists
and Civil Rights Advocates

Environmentalists need to do more, however, than simply modify
the structure of environmental lawmaking and reform its substance to
take better account of distributional concerns. Environmentalists need to
return to the roots of modem environmental law, reacquainting themselves with the natural relationship that exists between what is advocated
by both environmentalism and civil rights. Much suspicion and resentment currently exists between the two social movements. However, the
potential for claiming substantial common ground and shared values
still persists, as it did in the late 1960s when the civil rights movement
first spawned both the rhetoric and the tactics of modem"
environmentalists. 306
Similarities between the two movements, however, run deeper than
shared rhetoric or tactics. Both challenge the status quo as a means of
promoting and protecting the interests of those with less political power,
whether they be racial minorities, future generations of persons, or endangered species. Furthermore, to that end, both movements seek to reform those rules that tend to deny access to the institutions capable of
bringing about legal reform.
More substantively, both movements are redistributive in their ultimate focus. Civil rights plainly depends on a redistribution of wealth to
achieve its ends. 307 Similarly, environmentalism requires a de-emphasis
of existing absolutist notions of private property rights in natural resources, because the unrestrained exercise of such rights can create tremendous environmental degradation. 308 Therefore, both movements
Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 335, 340-41 (1990) (describing how
command and control confers great power to federal bureaucracies and courts). Others have questioned the ability of local governments to adopt and implement socially progressive programs that
benefit minority and low-income persons. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Low, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 24-58 (1990); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 346, 405-35 (1990). In the
environmental law context, I have recently joined those commentators in rebutting the thesis that
restrictions on property occasioned by modem environmental and natural resources law portend a
return to a hierarchical "feudal" order. See Richard J. Lazarus, Debunking "Environmental Feudalism": Promoting the Individual Through the Collective Pursuit of Environmental Quality, 77 IOWA
L. REv. 1739 (1992).
306 See supra note 10.
307 See generally HACKER, supra note 91; see also Bell, supra note 205, at 11-12 & nn.27-29.
308 See Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REv. 481
(1983); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources:
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REv. 631, 693-702 (1986); David B. Hunter, An
Ecological Perspective on Property: A Callfor Judicial Protection of the Public's Interests in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 311 (1988); Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and
Accommodation in Modem Property Low, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1529, 1548 (1989).
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tend to view, regardless of their legitimacy,309 those constitutional provisions aimed at preserving the status quo by protecting the existing distribution of private property rights as significant obstacles to the
achievement of their desired ends. Indeed, some civil rights scholars suggest that the Constitution's "giving priority to the protection of property" was intended to protect property in slaves. 310 Similarly,
environmentalists describe how "[t]he law is wedded to a concept of
property that gives precedence to a right to change the existing biologic
character of the land over increases in the owner's individual wealth.
The constitutional shibboleths of the Justices could freeze the fluid
stream of property law in the posture of acquisitive individualism."311
Environmentalists also need to apply ecological values closer to
home. There is some painful truth to the perception of many minorities
that environmentalists overlook the plight of humankind in their rush to
protect nature. 312 Indeed, in the end there is something perverse about
separating out human welfare-including the poverty suffered by whole
nations of persons around the world-from what it means to promote the
natural environment. Perhaps the reasons for this tendency lie in the
sheer tragedy of that human misery associated with the former; misery
that leads many otherwise well-intentioned individuals to shy away from
intertwining their own lives with such seemingly intractable and wrenching sadness.
Ecological values must recognize and embrace human welfare as an
invaluable part of the natural community.313 Environmentalists should,
therefore, strive to redress the basic human needs of those who are wanting as part of their central mission. Environmental protection should be
seen as a legitimate basis for promoting human welfare and opportunity
and, in particular, for redistributing environmental amenities (and risks)
more fairly among all persons. 314 The alternative, which juxtaposes the
environment against humankind, is a flawed and ultimately self-defeating
frame of reference for environmentalism.
Some recent scholarship suggests a possible reclamation of common
ground by the environmental and civil rights movements. Commenta309 See Tarlock, supra note 102, at 416 (positing distinction between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" property law claims).
310 Bell, supra note 205, at 6-7.
311 J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 39, 249 (1990) ("The opinions of
Scalia and Rehnquist suggest that a radical transformation of property law to reflect ecological values would encounter judicial resistance.... The task of green property law is both to find practical
mechanisms for utopian aspirations and to criticize those elements of the legal culture that obstruct
urgent reforms."); see Freyfogle, supra note 308, at 1544.
312 See supra notes 135-37, 159 and accompanying text.
313 Cj. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Bringing People Back: Toward A Comprehensive Theory o/Takings in Natural Resources Law, 10 EcOLOGY L.Q. 205 (1982).
314 Lazarus, supra note 305; MARK SAGOFF, THE EcONOMY OF THE EARTH-PHILOSOPHY,
LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 155-58, 167-70 (1988).
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tors have begun to look anew to civil rights discourse for ideas and inspiration for environmental protection law. 31S They point out the relevance
in each of notions of community, empathy, egalitarianism, and interconnectedness. For example, "Ecofeminism" embodies this new tradition of
cooperation in its effort to apply feminist ideology to environmental protection policy.316
It is essential, however, that the common ground that must be seized
extend beyond the inspirational or thematical and include pragmatic proposals for joining environmental protection and civil rights objectives in
shared endeavors. Mass transit is a simple, yet powerful example. Our
society'S excessive reliance on private motor vehicles needlessly wastes
natural resources and degrades the environment. Such reliance can also
create a substantial economic barrier to many career and recreational
opportunities. Those with fewer economic resources are less likely to
have access to the private transportation required to take advantage of
those opportunities. 317 Finally, billions of dollars are spent to construct
highways that subsidize the lifestyles of those who choose to live in the
more affluent neighborhoods outside major urban areas. For all these
reasons, however, promotion of mass transit offers the potential for promoting the interests of both minority and low-income persons and environmental protection. 318 Mass transit, in short, improves the
environment while simultaneously redistributing life's amenities more equitably. Environmentalists need to develop and promote other such natural unions between the two movements. 319
31S See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax's Public
Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1209, 1220-21 (1991); Freyfogle, supra note ISS, at 1547-48; A. Dan
Tarlock, Earth and Other Ethics: The Institutional Issues, 56 TENN. L. REv. 43 (1988).
316 See generally REWEAVING THE WORLD: THE EMERGENCE OF EcOFEMINISM (Irene Diamond & Gloria Feman Orenstein eds., 1990) (a collection of writings describing the history, philosophy, and goals of ecofeminism).
317 See, e.g., Martha Mahoney, Law and Racial Geography: Public Housing and the Economy in
New Orleans, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1251, 1279 (1990).
318 See John Pucher et aL, Socioeconomic Characteristics of Transit Riders: Some Recent Evidence, 35 TRAFFIC Q. 461, 480 (1981) ("[T]he poor, the elderly, minorities, and women do indeed
make a significantly higher percentage of their trips by transit than does the general population of
American urban areas."); see also Jonathan B. Robison, Fares and Fairness in Urban Public Transportation: The Needfor a Substantive Basisfor Agency Rate Making, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 903, 91516 (1982) (proposes requiring public transportation agencies to have a substantive basis, rather than
simply a procedural basis, for rate-making decisions to further, among other goals, a fare system
based upon rider's ability to pay).
319 An experimental program now being tested by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
further illustrates how the interests of minority and low-income persons may be harmonized with
environmental protection goals. Dubbed the "Clunkers for Cash" program, the Illinois EPA has
recently offered to buy pollution-prone older vehicles from 200 residents of Chicago's southside.
Prices for the vehicles vary depending on the level of pollution emitted by the car, with higher
emission vehicles bringing the owner a larger rebate. Officials hope that program participants will
use the cash to purchase or use more environmentally efficient transportation. See Toby Eckert,
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v.

CONCLUSION

Environmental justice offers two important lessons. The first is that
environmental policymakers need to take account of the distributional
implications of their decisions. Environmental policymakers' two traditional inquiries - "how much pollution is acceptable," and "what kinds
of legal rules would best ensure the accomplishment of that level of pollution" - ignore an essential factor: the distribution of environmental
benefits and burdens needs to be an explicit and well-considered element
of the environmental policy debate. The current approach, in which distributional concerns are a matter for behind-the-scenes negotiation in the
forging of political compromises, has led to unacceptable distributional
inequities. Only a few groups possess the substantial resources necessary
for entry into those closed fora where environmental decisions are made,
and the resulting distributions naturally favor these groups' own economic interests and/or value preferences.
To be sure, existing empirical evidence of distributional inequity
does not yet conclusively illustrate the depth of the problem. Therefore,
an immediate short term goal must be to improve the empirical data
base. However, the evidence that does exist, combined with the theoretical explanations that readily suggest why such a distributional phenomenon is likely, lend substantial support to the need for exploring the
possibility of more significant reforms. A theoretical analysis of the reasons why such inequities may exist, moreover, suggests that certain substantive reforms in environmental law, and structural reforms in the
policymaking framework upon which it has relied, could do much to
promote a fairer sharing of the benefits and burdens of environmental
protection.
The more significant lesson of environmental justice lies, however,
in its far broader social implications. The last two decades have witnessed a radical rewriting of the nation's laws in an effort to promote
environmental protection concerns. These laws have been widely viewed
as progressive in their thrust, and even excessively idealistic in their
stated goals. 320 It is enormously unsettling that such laws could themselves be riddled with distributional inequities, especially when the nation's modern environmental movement grew out of, and indeed was
EPA Offers to Clear Clunkers Off Road. Pollutants Out of Air: Program to Help State Comply with
Air Quality Standards. CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., Oct. 12, 1992. at 36; Stevenson Swanson, Illinois Rolls
Out Best Deal on Wheels. at Right Price, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1992, at 1. Insofar as these older
vehicles are primarily owned by low-income and minority urban residents, programs like this have
the potential to promote the benefits of environmental protection in the very urban areas where these
residents live and work, while insuring a more equitable distribution of the economic benefits and
burdens associated with such environmental protection. Significantly, such programs also provide a
unique way for low-income and minority residents to participate in the cleanup of their communities. Such incentive programs may be an important impetus for these and other residents to become
more involved in environmental protection generally.
320 See Dwyer, supra note Ill.
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largely inspired by, the civil rights movement that has long resisted those
very inequities.
Hence, for the same reason that environmental justice cannot be effectively redressed solely within the environmental law context, its
message must be understood as not being confined to that discrete area of
the law. Environmental justice reinforces the continuing and compelling
need for measures aimed at eliminating racial discrimination and its selfperpetuating vestiges on the broadest social scale. It confirms the pervasiveness of the distributional problems that persist and their racial origins. The problem is not one confined to a few discrete areas. The effects
linger far beyond where one lives, goes to school, and works to include
the price one pays for a car, the interest paid on a mortgage, and, it now
appears, even the quality of the air one breathes and the water one
drinks.
A full redressing of those distributional inequities that currently
seem to exist in environmental protection will, therefore, necessarily occur only with a change of present attitudes, including those rooted in
racial stereotypes. 321 It will likewise depend on effective redressing of the
vestiges of past discrimination. This includes efforts directed at facilitating or enhancing minority market and political power, their access to
information, educational facilities, and the other advantages of life, including enjoyment of the natural environment. 322 It may also require
reform of some civil rights laws to facilitate the bringing of racial discrimination claims. 323 The extent to which the pursuit of environmental
justice furthers this far more important and ambitious undertaking
should be the ultimate measure of its succesS. 324

321 Cf Aleinikoff, supra note 78, at 1107-20.
322 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RJGHTS REVOLUTION-REcONCEIVING THE REGULA-

TORY STATE 37, 39-41 (1990).
323 See Ayres, supra note 178, at 863-65; Randall L. Kennedy, Competing Conceptions of "Racial
Discrimination": A Response to Cooper and Graglia, 104 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 93, 98-100
(1991); see generally Bell, supra note 205. The extent to which the necessary causal nexus exists
between past constitutional violations and current racial disparities to support continuing civil rights
remedies aimed at ameliorating the latter is a matter of great contemporary contention. See Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992) (school desegregation).
324 There have been several significant developments since this article first went to the printer.
The United States Commission on Civil Rights is investigating EPA's compliance with Title VI.
Marianne Lavelle, EPA Enforcement to be Probed: By Rights Commission, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 1993,
at 3. Dr. Ben Chavis, who authored the UCC's 1987 Study, is the new Executive Director of the
NAACP. See NAACP Head Demands Environmental Action, NAT'L L.J., May 10, 1993, at 5.
Finally, the Senate recently passed legislation that would establish an "Office of Environmental Justice" in a cabinet-level EPA. 139 CoNG. REc. S5342, S5362 (daily ed. May 4, 1993).
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